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This research considers state narratives of war and peace in Colombia from 2002 to 2016 
as broadcasted in mass media through institutional campaigns, and it seeks to describe these 
campaigns as part of historicist practices that promote an ideal of the nation. The research 
follows the shifts in policies and discourses during the 21st century from promoting war to 
announcing peace by analyzing a visual archive made up of T.V commercials produced by the 
Colombian state in this period.  In doing so, the research considers the tensions between 
nationalism, war, peace and memory in a political setting marked by the proclamation of a 
transitional scenario. Finally it reflects on the ways the historicist practices of the state fix 
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“The way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe” 
Understanding a photograph, John Berger.1  
 
 
On June 23, 2016 the Colombian government and the guerrilla organization FARC signed 
the “cease of fire” agreement in Havana, Cuba. Just two months later, on August 24 of the same 
year, the “final agreement” to end the armed conflict was announced. On both dates people in 
Bogotá and other cities of the country celebrated the announcement in front of giant screens 
displayed in public squares. The visual record on how these ‘historical’ landmarks were received 
by the Colombian citizenry, are filled with the emotional reactions of people that expressed a 
collective sense of euphoria and excitement. These public responses captured in camera, were 
later turned into visual material for the campaign “Yes to peace” that sought to gather support for 
the following plebiscite in which Colombians were asked to ratify the agreements of Havana. 
What the events, their witnessing, and the recording of the witnessing allow to consider, are the 
sites of production of Colombian national history and the role of war and peace tropes within 
them. 
This research considers state narratives of war and peace in Colombia from 2002 to 2016 
as broadcasted in mass media through institutional campaigns, and it seeks to describe these 
campaigns as part of historicist practices that promote an ideal of the nation. The period selected 
reflects two different presidential administrations in Colombia. Alvaro Uribe’s (2002-2010) that 
promoted a militaristic solution to the war and whose political discourse revolved around the 
rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ and the insistence in the criminalization of the guerrillas as drug 
traffickers and terrorists. Uribe did this while putting forward a political agenda of re-insertion of 
                                                 




paramilitary groups to civil life. The second period (2010-2016) covers the administration of 
Juan Manuel Santos, a former Defense Minister of Uribe and the government’s candidate in the 
presidential elections of 2010. However, Santos has come to represent a distancing from Uribe’s 
approach to the war and started peace negotiations with the guerrillas. As a response of this 
alleged political rupture, there has been a re-orientation of the representations on war and peace 
and the narratives emerging from them. Nevertheless they can still be considered as part of the 
same historicist practices, often appeal to the same rhetorical devices, and contribute to the 
outlining of a particular national identity in which the ‘past’ war is crucial to their ends. 
Therefore, the argument is not that there is a direct correlation between Uribe and war campaigns 
or Santos and peace promotion; rather the intention is to explore how war and peace narratives 
are by no means mutually exclusive when it comes to imagining the nation.  The tensions 
between war and peace narratives do not comply with discrete time-frames or match exclusively 
one presidential administration or the other. They coalesce and work through nuanced regimes of 
representation, and they illuminate for us the complex power arrangements implied in the 
production of history of the war and (as) the history of the nation. 
Following the ways in which nation and war came to be equalized in the official 
discourse, does not necessarily produce ‘new’ information about the contexts of violence. 
Information about the war abounds in Colombia; scholars, activists and official sources have 
been documenting, counting, organizing, classifying and archiving the war since it began. To 
archive the war has a twofold meaning, transversal to this work. Because the way in which the 
history of war has been told and organized tells a history of power and its ways, but also because 




locate it in the past and far away, and this process has imprinted the historical development of the 
conflict in insidious ways.  
Therefore, this research is inscribed in the contexts of violence in Colombia, and yet is 
not concerned with the sometimes ritualistic reification of trauma or the reproduction of the 
events of violence that have caused almost 8 million victims in a country of 45 million 
inhabitants. The methodological and theoretical approaches work as an attempt to take a detour 
(to surpass or overcome is clearly unrealistic) from the (unintentional?) exploitative practices of 
the contexts of violence in Colombia that are not uncommon in scholarly and state sponsored 
literature about them. In this sense, violence is simultaneously the center and the margin of this 
research; the aim here it is not so much to ‘communicate violence’ but to interrogate it, and this 
means that this study seeks to follow the traces of the violence that appears in state narratives 
and to explore how they structure the possibilities for the nation to be imagined.  In discussing 
the notion of violence, this research draws from Lisa Cacho’s arguments about economies of 
value of life, in which violence can be understood as the material practices that enforce those 
hierarchies of value. This includes practices often associated with war such as murders, 
massacres, forced migration, forced disappearance and kidnappings; but also practices of land 
dispossession and denial of basic human rights.  Cacho argues that “the state acquires legitimacy 
and authority through sanctioning violence and formalizing disenfranchisement,”2 therefore, 
state violence is not only constituted through the state’s use of force but through legal procedures 
that arrange national belonging and citizen-subject status.  
Violence, memory and nation are articulated by Derrida when he argues that, 
“Foundational violence is not only forgotten. The foundation is made in order to hide it; by its 
essence it tends to organize amnesia, sometimes under the celebration and sublimation of the 
                                                 




grand beginnings.”3 Following Derrida this research also examines the ways in which 
reconciliation works as a foundational move that not only organizes amnesia but also conceals 
and endorses current and future contexts of state sanctioned violence.  
However, amnesia is not necessarily organized through official denial of the contexts of 
violence. In the Colombian case it seems to work in the hyper-visibility of the armed conflict and 
the powerful influence the tropes of the narratives on war have, of which the visual pieces 
examined in this research are just an example. Despite its non-exceptional character this cultural 
archive remains relevant, because it opens the possibility to look at state fantasies of the nation. 
The images considered in this research do not necessarily make an authenticity claim; they 
assumed awareness from the audience about the fictional resources utilized in the narrative. 
Looking at these visual pieces implies to ‘zoom in’ into the choices of drawing, from an 
ideological archive, particular rhetorical devices. And from there is possible to consider how 
those selective moves inform something about an aim of externalizing violence, not only from 
bodies or geographies but also (and most importantly perhaps) from the present.  
These commercials are useful insofar they are sites for multiple regimes of representation 
and their interplay. Also in the ways in which the images that ‘make it’ into the frame, speak 
about the images that do not; and this conversation between marginal and centered visual 
devices, between the grievable lives4  and the haunting spectrums,5 reveals a complex network of 
meanings of violence that looks to instill sharp divisions among an imagined ‘us’ versus a feared 
and repudiated ‘them’.  What is missing becomes part of the archive as well; because “between 
                                                 
3 Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. 57 
4 Ibid. 




images and in the interstices of how we have been taught to see, there are so many necessary and 
invisible forms.”6  
While discussing the ways in which the state imagines and portrays the nation, its 
territories and peoples, this research does not considers the state as a monolithic entity or clearly 
delimited actor, rather as a set of processes and practices that can t ke the form of institutions or 
networks. Here, the cautionary arguments of Timothy Mitchell around the forms in which power 
and domination are often described prove useful. Mitchell claims that power has broadly been 
understood in term of dichotomies that reduce its complex nature. He calls nframing the 
techniques in which “domination works through actually constructing a seemingly dualistic 
world”.7 To Mitchell power does not work in two separate and opposite realms, both coercion 
and persuasion are desired effects of domination as well as the imaginary (in the sense of fictive) 
line often draw between them. Therefore, in Mitchell’s view the state will be nothing more that a 
set of practices that via regulations (e.g the law) separate themselves from their material 
consequences, thus, legal technologies create the effect of the state. Parallel to the 
persuasion/coercion dichotomy, Mitchell argues that traditional definitions of the state have 
sought to differentiate state from society. The author identifies that boundary as uncertain and 
proposes instead to consider how the production of the state/society divide is constitutive of a 
social order; therefore “the state is no longer to be taken as essentially an actor, with the 
coherence, agency, and subjectivity this term presume.”8 Ultimately, Mitchell calls for an 
understanding of the state not as a structure but as a structural effect, this is the result of a set of 
practices that make apparent the existence of the state as an entity separated from society. 
Mitchell’s arguments are echoed by Joe Migdal when he defines the state as a “field of power 
                                                 
6 Tapia, American Pietàs: Visions of Race, Death and the Maternal. 131. 
7 Mitchell, “Everyday Metaphors of Power.” 547 




marked by the use and threat of violence (…) actual states are shaped by two elements, image 
and practices”.9This research argues that in the case of the Colombian state, those practices are 
inseparable from the narratives on war and peace and the ideals of the imagined community of 
the Colombian nation that are embedded within them.  
 The tropes of sight, gaze and the visual field are also central features in this research, and 
thus, their signification cannot be taken for granted, nor the historical linkage of images with 
knowledge and power. The visual is first the core of the archive examined: the visual features of 
the commercials compose the state narratives on war and peace. The image as a site of 
knowledge, allows for a metaphor that considers the elements inside the frame and the ones that 
remain in the margins, and thus works to inquire the logics and tensions between presences and 
absences and what can be learnd from them. Moreover, this work is also engaged with the ways 
in which spectatorship involves practices of seeing/gazing, and how these abilities are inscribed 
in power exchanges and knowledge practices. Finally, the gaze is also understood here as a 
distortable and always modifiable ‘apparatus’, ‘technology’ or ‘device’; therefore it also 
questions the ways in which the narratives on war and peace are able to modify an audience’s 
ability to ‘see’ and ‘envision’ the nation. Also, how such envisioning of the nation by the state 
underwrites the class, race and gender cleavages that have been the foundation of the contexts of 
violence in the country. Going back to John Berger’s quote at the beginning of this section, is 
possible to extend his argument to consider that the act of seeing is always producing new (even 
if ‘the same’) knowledge and beliefs. It follows that audiences might read state’s narratives 
based on their knowledge and beliefs about the war, but the narratives are also ‘creating’ a new 
referential world in juxtaposition to the death-worlds produced by the actual war.  
                                                 




Ultimately, the objective of this research is to follow the configuration of what sociologist 
Avery Gordon defines as an oppressed past, “whatever organized violence has repressed and in 
the process formed into a past.”10  If, as argued here, the different reconciliation processes in 
Colombia work towards the concealment of past (and new) violences, the main goal of this 
research is to trace elements embedded in the campaigns’ commercials that collaborate with that 
process; to follow the representational procedures that render violence as past, and past as 
oppressed. Much of this research emerges from the haunting histories that are not told or (not 
necessarily different from these ones) that never were. And yet there is not at the end of this 
work (or anywhere else) a prescription or counter history to be found. Because there is power in 
looking,11 the gaze proposed in here seeks to deconstruct the narratives on war and peace that the 
Colombian state has produced in the last 14 years. From this examination, the only possible 
outcome might be merely a provocation, a stubborn insistence in interrogating the images and 
the violences that they depict, reproduce, and perform.  
Historical Context 
Scholarship that has addressed the political violence in Colombia has been also deeply 
influenced by the tropes used by the state. The script constantly revolves around a set of ideas 
about violence that, more often than not, demand a stronger presence of the state. However, even 
in the cases when there is a critique of the participation of state forces in the human rights 
violations against civil society, it is not likely to find a challenge to the idea of the nation itself. 
The central argument of this research is that the Colombian state deploys historicist practices 
around the contexts of violence that had taken place (and still do) in the national territory; 
furthermore, these historicist practices have become the privileged avenue to understand the 
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Colombian nation. Wielding war and ending war, work as powerful imaginaries that bind the 
nation as a unity and conceal the violences of the nation-state. As Josefina Echavarría argues 
“Colombian history has been made a history of war.” 12 Thus, it is a highly complex task to 
provide a historical context that helps to understand the narratives in which the state produces a 
particular history of the nation. Complex but imperative, this section elaborates on some 
interpretations of the recent history of the armed conflict in Colombia.  
Historian Fernán González argues that historically “internal violence has played a major 
role in the configuration of the Colombian state.”13 This is a thesis that enjoys a good amount of 
popularity in the academic understanding of the Colombian nation-state and its historical marks 
as ‘unstable’, ‘incomplete’ and  of course, ‘violent’. Daniel Pécaut explains this interpretation as 
a result of the banalization of violence in the Colombian context. 14 The XIX century 
independence struggle and subsequent wars are tied by historians with the violent period of 
bipartisan confrontations between liberales and conservadores of the first half of the 20th 
century, and the latter are considered to bear all the elements of the contexts of violence that will 
appear in the second half and that extend to this day. About this recent violence15 Pécaut argues, 
“It was not only common to present it as a continuation of The Violence of the fifties, even as a 
violence that had permanently characterized Colombian history with no interruption, but it was 
not odd to assert that its expansion, however tragic for the victims, was also beneficial for many 
sectors.”16    
What is clear in the history of the contexts of violence in Colombia is that they have been 
extended in time and unequal in space. Whether an uninterrupted continuum of terror or a set of 
                                                 
12 Echavarría, In/security in Colombia. 36 
13 González, Poder y violencia en Colombia. 515.  
14 Pécaut, La Experiencia de La Violencia: Los Desafíos Del Relato Y La Memoria. 
15 That has been marked historically with the emergence of the first guerrilla organizations (1957).  




independent conflicts, the inhabitants of the nation have endured decades of violence with 
significant social, cultural and economic impacts. Also, some geographies have suffered the 
effects of the different armed confrontations more than others. Therefore, when talking about the 
‘war in Colombia’, there has to be a clarification of what period and territory is being discussed. 
Following this argument, when referring to ‘the war’ or ‘the armed conflict’ in this research the 
intention is not to provide a homogenizing portrayal of the contexts of violence that had 
historically taken place in Colombia, but to discuss the war as a trope through which nationalist 
discourses, appeals and policies are produced.   
In his work Power and Violence in Colombia, González traces a history in what he 
identifies as a continuum of violence that starts with the wars of independence, and argues that 
the violence of the 19th century bears the same political homogenizing goal as that of the 20th. 
Often referred to as La Violencia (The Violence) or La época de la violencia (The times of 
violence) the period from the 1930s to the 1950s17 has come to represent a landmark in 
Colombian history; a bipartisan armed confrontation, sometimes understood as a civil war, 
divided the country and dominated its political life for over two decades. González discusses the 
ways in which during this period the former local manifestations of violence for political 
hegemony “ended up being framed in a deeper rupture, caused by the confrontation between the 
modernizing efforts of liberal governments and the resistance of sectors of the conservative party 
and the Catholic Church, that will lead to a much higher polarization of Colombian society.”18 In 
the 1950s, the repressive governments of Laureano Gómez and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, paired 
with the international revolutionary upheaval represented in the region by the Cuban revolution, 
provided the political context for an insurgency to flourish in the form of guerrilla organizations 
                                                 
17 There is not an absolute consent about the exact dates of the period known as La Violencia. Here the time 
span is meant to provide a less conservative account from the one that frames it from 1948 to 1957.  




which were also reflecting a radicalized sector of the bipartisan confrontation of the previous 
decades. The agreements made in 1957 between the Liberal and Conservative parties to take 
turns in power, known as Frente Nacional (National Front) signified the elites’ way to conceal 
the horrid violence towards which they had previously pushed the civil population. From 
guerrillas of liberal political orientation, there was a shift towards communist guerrillas (FARC, 
ELN, EPL and M-19)19 that consolidated their presence in the territory for decades to come.20 
The context of violence that emerged from the confrontation of the state forces and the leftist 
guerrillas is the most relevant one for the purposes of this research. Understanding that by no 
means it is possible to provide a comprehensive account of its development, some important 
features of that context and its history must be highlighted.  
Authors agree that the root cause of the recent armed conflict is the lack of an agrarian 
reform.21 This led to the migration from rural to urban areas (both impoverished) throughout the 
century which paired with the already polarized political setting and influenced by the 
continental and transnational dynamics of the time, increased the social unrest. A second feature 
that makes the armed conflict that began on the 1960s more complex is drug trafficking, which 
quickly became a crucial factor on the survival of guerrillas and a major reason for the brutal 
pushback of the state, in both its military campaigns and ideological contestations.  
Third, in the historical development of the conflict there have been several attempts to 
negotiate peace with the guerrillas.22 The first major one took place during the administration of 
Belisario Betancour in 1982; afterwards president Virgilio Barco managed to sign peace 
                                                 
19 FARC-EP: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia- People s Army ; ELN: Ejército de Liberación National Army of Nacional Liberation); EPL: 
Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Army of Liberation); M-19: Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19th 
Movement). 
20 Pécaut, La Experiencia de La Violencia: Los Desafíos Del Relato Y La Memoria. 
21 Ibid.; González, Poder y violencia en Colombia. 




agreements with the M-19 and EPL guerrillas in 1990 which also resulted in the creation of  
new constitution in 1991. More recently, president Andrés Pastrana promoted in 1998 new peace 
negotiations with the largest guerrilla organization, the FARC. However, González argues that 
“the ambiguities of that negotiation ended up deepening the rupture in the articulation among 
local and regional powers with the national government, this was reinforced by the abuses of the 
guerrilla in the de-militarized zone.”23 During the last decade of the century, Colombians had 
also seen the escalation of the guerrilla’s violent acts. The FARC’s territorial disputes with 
paramilitaries, druglords and state forces consistently contradicted their public declarations of 
seeking a negotiated solution to the conflict. Increasing numbers of murders, kidnappings, 
attacks and harassment of civilians were consistently registered by mass media and paved the 
way for the ending of that cycle negotiations in 2001. These violent acts were not only perceived 
as a mockery to the peace process but also reinforced a sense of widespread impunity and a 
growing social unrest against illegal armed groups.24 The failure of what was seen at one point as 
the historical final step to end the war, produced social discomfort against the guerrillas and a 
lack of strong policies of the state, and thus it provided the best climate for the policy of ‘mano 
dura’ (strong arm policies) of Álvaro Uribe Vélez to gain sympathizers.  
As a final element,  the conflict between the ‘legitimate’ forces of the state and the rebels 
was further complicated by the appearance of paramilitary groups that although often presented 
as merely a response to the armed insurgency, have always had the purpose of terrorizing civil 
society (mainly to usurp their lands) and repressing social movements. These organizations have 
had both the implicit and explicit support of the Colombian state, Nazih Richani explains that “In 
1965, Decree 3389 was introduced by the Colombian state. When it became law in 1968 it 
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authorized private citizens to organize and carry firearms. This law allowed the formation of 
paramilitaries as an explicit part of the state’s strategy to combat insurgency (…) although the 
state subsequently introduced a new decree in 1989, in which it suspended the creation of these 
groups, by then they were up and running and the Colombian state was neither willing nor 
capable of fighting them.”25  State sponsorship of paramilitary groups was reactivated in 1994 
when “Decree 356 of 1994 opened the way for the creation of self-defense groups called 
Convivir.”26 These organizations confederated in 1997 under the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia- AUC, a paramilitary group that by the time of its legal disintegration was made up of 
more than 30.000 members.27 It was under Uribe’s administration that the process of re-insertion 
of the paramilitaries took place, marked by the signing of the Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement i  
July 15, 2003.28 The formal disappearance of paramilitaries allowed for a stronger offensive 
against the guerrillas. The historical development of this period of violence and the handling of 
the conflict in both the political and military arenas by the Colombian state set the climate for the 
presentation of Álvaro Uribe as the ultimate patriotic leader, and of his policies as the only viable 
option of the nation.   
Uribe’s approach decimated the guerrillas and managed to provoke a reorientation of 
large sectors of the population against the FARC.29 Nevertheless the victims of both illegal and 
state forces continued to increase during his eight years in power. In 2010, president Juan 
Manuel Santos was presented as the continuation of Uribe’s discourse and policies, however, 
after eight years of militaristic efforts, the new government considered the guerrillas had been 
                                                 
25 Richani, Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State.  -7.  
26 García-Godos and Lid-Knut, Transitional Justice and Victims  Rights before the End of a Conflict.  492.  
27 Londoño Fernández, Ramírez Parra, and others, Estudio Sobre El )mpacto de La Reinserción Paramilitar En La Vida de Las Mujeres de Comunidades Receptoras de Medellín, Bajo Cauca Y Urabá.  
28 Ibid.  
29 This included the promotion of a massive protest in February, 2008 against FARC and in support of the 




weakened enough to start peace negotiations again. The peace process -which had been casted by 
the state as unviable after Pastrana’s failure - was placed at the forefront of Santos’ 
administration. Peace supporters were no longer rendered as the terrorists allies,30 but instead 
portrayed as what every Colombian should become.  
Thesis Overview 
The first chapter considers the challenges in working with T.V commercials produced by 
the state on war and peace, and how they come to form an archive from which the historicist 
practices of the state can be outlined. In developing a theoretical and methodological framework 
for this research, this section provides the routes taken in order to fight the (logical?) impulse to 
interpret such narratives as merely propagandistic efforts of the state, and argues for a close 
reading of the commercial as texts in order to attend to what Sara Ahmed has described as the 
“grammatical specificity of the construction of the nation.”31   
Chapter two, War Spectacles, deals with the narratives on war produced mainly during 
Álvaro Uribe’s administration (2002-2010) and the representational efforts embedded in the 
promotion of a militaristic solution to the armed conflict. Uribe’s political agenda seeking the 
physical extermination of the rebels needs to be paired with the actions of his government in the 
process of reinserting the paramilitaries, and this means that there were particular narratives on 
peace and reconciliation during his period as well. In the midst of these tensions, this section 
considers the ways in which the nation has come to be imagined through a lens of war.  
Chapter three, Peace is Possible, xplores how the naming of a transitional scenario 
becomes a fundamental site of power from which is possible to reify and refashion state 
sanctioned violence. Covering primarily the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-
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present) and the political events related to the peace negotiations with the FARC, this section 
examines the problematic nature of transitional and reconciliation scenarios, not only in the ways 
in which they arrange history into a ‘now’ and ‘then’, but also how these scenarios ‘take place’ 
within the same oppressive setting, that is, the nation-state. 
The conclusion reflects on the ways the historicist practices of the state fix victimhood 
between the duty to forgive and the permission to forget. It also points towards further archival 
research capable of providing a more comprehensive account of the ways the Colombian nation 
is underwritten with the history of the war; and considers the violences that are likely to be found 










This introductory chapter considers how the commercials produced by the Colombian 
state form an archive on war and peace. Although some authors have argued that the term 
archive “has become a kind of loose signifier for a disparate set of concepts,”32 it works here as a 
way to describe the collection of cultural texts emerging from the dissection, narration and 
fictionalization of the history of war in Colombia, as well as the merging of this history with a 
national(ist) discourse.  
Within this framework it is worth to ask how this particular method (T.V commercials) 
for transmitting information about the war, shapes the knowledge that can be produced; not only 
to understand the war but the nation that has ‘lived’ it. Needless to say that the selection of such 
method is by no means accidental, and the established tie between war and nation is a constant 
interplay of inclusions and exclusions, of erasures and fabrications. The argument here is not 
merely that the “war spectacles” are destroying the archival record of what can be known about 
the history of the war, rather that these proclamations (and their silences) constitute an archive in 
themselves. When an archive is destroyed, that very destruction is inscribed somehow in the 
social fabric, and the involved events, however recorded (and there is little doubt they will be 
recorded) leave new traces (haunting absences?); a new archive that can be followed trough the 
interrogation of its symptoms.  
This section starts by describing the theoretical framework that enables the debate 
concerning the main argument of the research, this is, that the commercials on war and peace 
perform a significant amount of historical work meant to imagine the nation. It also contains a 
review of the relevant literature to interrogate the interaction between images and the production 
                                                 




of a national history; as well as the ways in which current scholarship in Colombia has not 
developed an analysis of the commercials produced by the state that considers such interaction. 
The second part of the chapter reflects on the possibilities offered by the archive and the 
theoretical lenses that collaborate with the argument in the following chapters.  
Literature Review 
 
This research emerges from the argument that the narratives on war and peace 
disseminated by the Colombian state through visual representations can illuminate the historical 
and political setting in which the understanding of the armed conflict became essential to 
imagining the nation. To explore the relationship between representations of violence and 
national identity there is a need to address both the theoretical discussion on representation and 
violence, as well as the scholarship that has devoted its efforts to grapple with the processes of 
national formation and the particular role of nationalism within them.  
Hurting images  
First, interrogating the visual narratives that emerge from the contexts of violence in 
Colombia, demands the development of a theoretical framework around the notion of 
representation, its practices and its visual forms.  Feminist authors have largely discussed the 
ways in which representation and spectatorship are cultural forces that operate in different levels 
of power relationships. Drawing from their keen insights and unsettling arguments, it is possible 
to put forward the idea of representation of violence as violence itself; in other words, the ways 
in which the war is represented by the Colombian state not only conceal state violence but 




national reconciliation and peace agreements, such as the ones that have been gaining 
predominance in the Colombian political scene since 2003.33  
The issue of representation is constantly discussed along the problem of spectatorship; 
they are the two sides of a set of social practices that revolve around the negotiation of particular 
texts, narratives, discourses and images. Althusser’s notion of ideology,34 as well as Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony,35 speak to the ways in which representations of reality are fabricated to 
produce an effect of domination in the audience. Echoing this idea, on Chomsky’s definition of 
propaganda,36 representations are always made with an audience in mind; therefore, they are 
considered to have a premeditated persuasive effect. This interpretation is part of a strong 
theoretical tradition that has sought to unravel the political intentions of ‘manipulating the 
masses’. However, an analysis of the visual, only focused on how “convincing” or “effective” 
some images are, limits the possibilities to address the configuration of national narratives that 
transcend the immediate political profitability in which propaganda is often framed. Ann Laura 
Stoler’s reading of Gramsci on the role of the state, offers a complementary insight: the state is 
not merely invested in educating consent but also (most importantly perhaps) in schooling 
desire.37 The narratives on war and peace examined in this research go beyond attempts of 
persuading the audience; they are meant to shape the desires and expectations of differentiated 
subjects (victims, non-victims, perpetrators) while discursively producing a post-conflict national 
setting. 
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Without denying the powerful propagandistic effort (and effect) of visual narratives, this 
section moves away from that argument to consider how the intervention of feminists around 
representation has resulted in an interrogation of the interplay between the regimes of 
representation 38and other forces of oppression. This means that the images as cultural texts have 
a social force, but that force can be understood only in the larger comprehension of 
manifestations of power inequalities.  
Patricia Hill Collins refers to the controlling images39 produced historically to represent 
Black women and describes those images as mechanisms meant to normalize social injustices 
such as sexism, racism, and poverty. Collins’s analysis is not only circumscribed to visual 
representations; the images she discusses belong to a wider set of practices in which visuality 
plays a significant, but not unique, role. What Collins notices as remarkable in these images is 
their capacity to endure after the social dynamics of power have changed. Representation, then 
follows, is not only about the immediate instrumental use of particular rhetorical devices to 
reinforce categories of people, it also works as sediment for new forms of oppression and 
violence, always ready to emerge. This means that after a particular image has been consistently 
disseminated it becomes part of an ideological archive.40 In the case of the Colombian 
reconciliation context, the images of the armed conflict work as reminiscences. Even after war is 
no longer promoted, the previous images of war enable the new ones of peace.   
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This temporality of images is a crucial dimension when looking at the ways in which 
images work towards the constitution of social subjects. For example, Wendy Kozol,41analyzed 
the relocation of Japanese American citizens in photographs of internment camps during WWII. 
She argues that “subjects are produced through the interactions of material and discursive 
practices.”42 The historicist practices of the state are characterized not only by a linkage between 
war and national identity, but also by an outlining of the ideal subjects of the nation. While 
subjection is a term closely linked to the notions of ideology or hegemony, these feminists’ 
perspectives around subjects render them as much more unstable and in need of a 
multidimensional reading of the types of violences that their images endorse.  Following Kozol, 
the “body [is] not only a site upon which hegemonic power is written but also (…) a site of the 
complex and often contradictory conditions of gender, racial, sexual, and/or national identity.”43 
Rather than looking for fixated identities portrayed in the commercials produced by the state, this 
research aims to trace how the state’s imagined subjects of the Colombian nation take place in 
the historicist practices surrounding the armed conflict.  
How then, are these images received, negotiated and transgressed by the social subjects 
that they deal with? Gloria Anzaldúa defines la facultad as “the capacity to see in surface 
phenomena the meaning of deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface. It is an 
instant “sensing,” a quick perception arrived at without conscious reasoning.”44 The starting 
point of this research is based on this “sense,” in Anzaldúa’s terms, that below the superficial 
propagandistic nature of the Colombian state campaigns, there lies a complex network of 
historical, political, economic, and cultural agendas, relations and powers.  
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La facultad allows a particular way of “seeing through things;” thus, provoking 
disidentification with the images that seek to lock people as subjects and allowing room for the 
critique of such images. Echoing some of these insights, bell hooks45  argues for the recognition 
of the conventional representations that do violence to the image, and how this ignites an 
examination of the role of spectator, considered in this research as those who are the intended 
audience of the representations of contexts of systematic violence. In other words, both 
Anzaldúa’s and hook’s arguments immediately direct attention to how the representations of the 
war are not only imagining subjects, but addressing them with different appeals.  
Both representation and spectatorship configure the circulation of images capable of 
doing violence. One approach to this issue is provided by Laura Wexler’s46 conceptualization of 
the photograph as a weapon. The author re-centers the logics of violence implicit in representing 
the Other and the possibilities of recovering the elements the image seeks to render dead. 
Furthermore, Wexler argues that the erasure of subjectivity and the inscription of an ‘othering’ 
identity through visual practices in general and in photography in particular, have been often 
disregarded in an academic reluctance that the author calls photographic anekphrasis, a refusal 
to see the violence happening in and through the image. Wexler’s arguments invoke another 
essential element in the analysis of images: the gaze behind the camera. It would be too easy to 
assume that behind the camera, there’s always the holder of social power, one that occupies one 
of the higher (if not the highest) locations in the social hierarchy; reality is of course more 
complex. Since producing images about an ‘other’ is always a form of exercising power, it is 
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also common to locate behind the lens those who seek to gain value by devaluing others.47
Wexler analyzes the production of domesticity by women photographers in the nineteenth 
century, and rather than ascribing an unquestioned positive value to the women behind the 
camera’s lens, the author calls attention to what different images/representation do f r different 
people: She argues that “it is a mistake to assume that the value of a domestic images is the same 
for all through whose hands it passes (…) under certain conditions of political domination, 
ordinary-looking family photographs can be highly manipulative weapons.”48 In the photographs 
analyzed by Wexler, violence is concealed mainly because the image is produced under a 
different lens (domesticity).  The complex process of representation does not become any easier 
when the violence is blatantly captured by the camera lens. In visual representations of the war, 
the visibility does not necessarily translate into an acknowledgment or empathy. Representations 
of violence as violence itself are also effective in obscuring structures of power and pushing to 
the margins whatever elements of that violence do not fit in the frame.  
Regarding images involved in historicist practices around the war, Judith Butler 
intervenes to reminds us that “there’s no way to separate under present historical conditions, the 
material reality of war from those representational regimes through which it operates and which 
rationalize its own operation.”49 What Butler is suggesting is more than the already-known 
propagandistic objective of representations of war in certain social and political settings that 
demand the manufacturing of consent.  Her argument merges violence and its representation as 
one, bearing a relational and interdependent nature, and this implies that from a theoretical 
standpoint there is no possibility of addressing one while disregarding the other.   
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Both Wexler’s and Butler’s arguments on the contiguous nature of different forms of 
violence (in this research’s case war and representation) allow a further development of how 
images that represent “past” violences are then enabling “present” ones to go both unrepresented 
and unnoticed. Their reflections are equally important to grapple with the processes of 
dehumanization that are concomitant to the infliction of violence. This denial of personhood and 
the differential allocation of social value are deeply tied to the configuration of the boundaries of 
the modern nation-state.  
From these authors’ interventions it is possible to argue that the production, reproduction, 
contestation and re-creation of social representations in visual practices are processes always 
located in the complex web of power structures that configure social contexts. To interrogate the 
image is to question the power relations (and the violence within them) invested in the visual. In 
examining the ways in which these violences intervene in how nations are imagined, it is useful 
to consider the theories around nation formation and nationalism covered in the next section. 
Rising nations  
These reflections on the particular features and functions of the representation of war 
move us towards considerations around national formation. When Derrida50 d scusses the 
foundational violence of the nation, he is arguing that nation and war are forever tied. This 
bonding then leads to the particular manifestations of violence within nationalism. If, following 
Butler,51 the frames of war determine what lives are worth grieving for; then it can be argued that 
within nationalist ideologies those grievable lives are also those who belong to the nation.  
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In Imagined Communities,52 Benedict Anderson emphasizes on the importance of media 
in configuring the elements that enable people to see themselves as belonging to a national unity. 
In his widely quoted definition of the nation, Anderson explains that “it is an imagined political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”53 The limits and sovereign 
rights of the nation extend to its spatial and social dimensions. In the armed conflict in Colombia 
these two realms of power have been constantly contested. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the 
production of a particular history of the war and its conclusion (by the promulgation of a long-
awaited peace) is constantly reaffirming the existence of clearly limited and rightfully governed 
geographies and peoples.  
In this regard, Homi Bhabha54 discusses the production of the nation as narration; one of 
ambivalent nature regarding the pedagogical and performative sides of national identity in which 
national subjects are trapped. Countering Anderson’s arguments, Bhabha concludes that the 
homogeneity of the nation is always contested by those who inhabit its margins, and thus he 
argues that ““to study the nation through its narrative address does not merely draw attention to 
its language and rhetoric; it also attempts to alter the conceptual object itself.”55 This means that 
examining the ways in which the nation is narrated leads to an uncovering of its fractures and its 
inability of self-fulfillment, what Bhabha refers to as the constitutive contradictions of the 
national text. Nevertheless, Bhabha adds, in spite of its contradictory nature the nation continues 
to work as a powerful Western idea in which history is always in the making.  From this 
perspective then, the representations of war in Colombia (and the citizens’ recovery from it 
through discourses of peace and reconciliation) become signifiers of the ways in which the 
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history of violence (and nation) are always in the production of more violence (and more 
national bonding).  
Nation and nationalism compose the background of this study insofar as the narratives are 
always aiming to define both. The commercials produced by the Colombian state portray a 
nation overcoming war and subsequently arrange the appropriate nationalist feelings it must 
inspire in its members. In order to develop a critique of these historicist practices of the 
Colombian state, this research departs from any romanticized or hopeful view of the nation, 
understanding it as a project that regulates difference in terms of class, gender, sexuality, race 
and ethnicity. The features of the nation highlighted in this study are the ones that inflict violence 
on its citizen-subjects, and in the Colombian case, particularly on those who had been 
historically the victims of structural and state-sanctioned violence. If the nation-state not only 
underpins and prescribes, but it is based upon the exercise of violence, then the argument 
presented here appears as a restatement of the obvious. Nevertheless, looking at the large amount 
of scholarship invested in grappling with the nuances of the war (and peace) in Colombia the 
argument seems like a needed one. In other words, what results most problematic about the 
historicist practices that can be drawn from the commercials is not that they contain a strong 
nationalist appeal, is not that they produce knowledge about the past; but that they produce a 
past that underwrites the nation as a historical destiny. Thus the war (located in the past) is an 
affirmation of the nation insofar as it is presented as the threat that has been defeated. 
These considerations revolve around a wide set of unfulfilled aspirations: security, 
hegemony, sovereignty, national destiny and nationalist commitment.  The images of war and 
peace considered in this research are produced by the state to fill in the cracks created by all 




most important rhetorical device: it is not that the nation ‘fails’ to be totalizing (as in hegemonic) 
but that this ‘failure’ justifies its existence. It forces national subjects to the endeavor of 
producing the nation, and thus, imagining the nation is nothing more than to invest in it.  
Tales of war 
This research establishes the (somewhat arbitrary?) timeframe from 2002 to 2016 to 
examine the T.V commercials produced by the Colombian state. The rationale behind this choice 
is explained by the relevance of the policies around war and peace that took place during this 
period. The two presidential administrations covered (Álvaro Uribe’s and Juan Manuel Santos’) 
were deeply invested in the discourse of war as the primary concern of the nation. Nevertheless, 
the scholarship that has examined the media presence of the government and its policies during 
this period has been more concerned with making the case of war and peace representations as 
propaganda, than to further the argument on how those propagandistic efforts work beyond their 
immediate and more apparent objectives. The tales of war (and nation) in themselves have not 
been at the center of these analysis. 
The political setting in which the 2002 presidential elections in Colombia took place, 
favored the growing support towards more reactionary approaches to the armed conflict. This 
position came to be represented in the figure of Uribe, and it guaranteed his election on the first 
round of voting on May 26 of that year. From the beginning the president portrayed himself as a 
prominent ‘mediatic’ figure, positioning his public persona and policies in order to figure 
prominently in the news headlines during his eight years in power.56 His highly conservative 
opinions and tendency to polemicize, paired with the communication strategies of his 
administration (which included televised monthly meetings with citizens in different towns), 
                                                 




gave him an unprecedented preeminence in the media. This particular cooptation of the 
Colombian media by the state is perhaps what guides most of the studies done around mass 
media in the 2002-2010 period. The compelling popularity and public support of Uribe might 
explain the scholars’ over-investment in the propagandistic effects of those discourses. This has 
left unattended the long-term consequences of narrating the nation through the language of war.  
In his work Fictions of Power57 (covering the period from 2002 to 2010) Fabio López 
considers the media interventions of the state in a broad spectrum of news, speeches, and official 
addresses. He identifies Uribe’s patriotic discourse as authoritarian right-wing nationalism and 
the overarching communication regime that this configured. This regime was based upon the 
binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ the war on terror, anti-FARC sentiments, an unconditional defense 
of institutions, religious appeals, and the stigmatization of social movements, NGOs, 
independent journalism, and human rights groups. Nevertheless, the most compelling rhetorical 
device identified by López is the ahistorical valuation that Uribe presented of his own 
government; a ‘before’ and ‘after’ narrative, which worked both to emphasize the exceptionalism 
of his administration and to refute any critiques towards his political moves.  
López also analyzes the ways in which the regime of communication was affected by the 
political scandals of the last years of Uribe’s administration: ties of members of his government 
with paramilitaries, institutional corruption, and the army’s violations of human rights. These 
worked to lower the popularity of the president and opened spaces for the future policies on war, 
more focused on a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. López concludes his analysis 
suggesting that “in the affective re-definition of the nation, not only was an busive 
fictionalization of the present and the past produced, but also a dangerous ideological unity that 
                                                 




favored authoritarianism, militarization and the stigmatization of those who thought different.”58 
Devoting his analysis to that dangerous ideological unity, López disregards the rich argument 
behind the fictionalization of history.  
Along the same lines of López’s analysis, Claudia Gordillo59 provides in her book 
Mediatic Security an overview of the campaigns produced during Uribe’s administration. 
Looking at the campaign “Heroes in Colombia Do Exist,” Gordillo describes how the campaign 
works as a device to manufacture consent under the Hero rhetoric: “These campaigns and 
programs of the government are read in this study as political propaganda, insofar as one of its 
aims is to persuade, bond and coalesce individuals around a specific political discourse that 
produced, not only a type of security, but also new ways of control.”60 According to Gordillo, the 
rhetoric embedded in the campaigns was meant to achieve society’s agreement with the policies 
of reinforcing the military and defeating terrorism. This, the author argues, was produced by the 
dissemination of fear and the emotional interpellation of the public. Linking it back to the 
Democratic Security Policy (DSP) of Uribe’s government, Gordillo presents the campaigns as a 
spectacle and simulation of the war which made these security policies necessary. She argues 
that DSP was a biopolitical device of ‘immunization’ of the audiences, and the campaigns were 
contributing to the functioning of that mechanism. The fictional discourses of the state promoted 
by the campaign commercials are always working in a necropolitical61 logic to establish the 
extent of the state’s sovereign right to kill; while the ultimate sacrifice of those who wield that 
right is praised as the epitome of Colombian patriotism. Emphasizing the centrality of media in 
the Colombian political context, the author ends her analysis by claiming that “It is only through 
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the mediatization of the war, of power and government discourse that these logics have been able 
to prosper.”62 
Gordillo’s and López’ analyses are the most comprehensive ones in terms of the time 
period and the spectrum of information covered. Other media studies have been more concerned 
with specific political events during Uribe’s presidency. A brief overview here serves to 
highlight the main topics addressed by and the tendencies of the scholarship produced around 
this issue.  
Scholar Juan Carlos Gomez63 argues how politics is merged with television nowadays. In 
his case study the author analyzes news coverage of the assassination of one of Colombia’s state 
governors and his peace advisor by the FARC in 2003. Describing the purposeful ambiguities of 
political performance in Colombian media, Gómez foresees the consolidation of a regime of 
political communication in which “predominates an intermediation of mass media in the 
relationships of governors and governed.”64 For Gómez this media intervention was instrumental 
to maintain Uribe’s popularity and to manufacture people’s consent and approval of his 
government’s policies.  
This popularity allowed Uribe to carry out a constitutional reform in order to be reelected. 
Andrés Yepes-Charry65 shows how during the reelection approval process one of the most 
influential Colombian magazines showed support for the reform by reinforcing a positive image 
of Uribe and presenting the process as a needed tool in order to keep him, and the DSP, ruling 
the country. In 2006, Álvaro Uribe became the first Colombian president to be consecutively 
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reelected. Raúl Enrique García and Maria Juliana Quintero66 lo k at the socio-discursive 
development of his second campaign against leftist candidate Carlos Gaviria. The authors 
examined one major national newspaper preference for Uribe’s candidacy by its depiction of him 
as a charismatic political figure and the legitimization of his political agenda. On the other hand, 
his opponent was always portrayed under an uncertainty frame regarding his campaign successes 
and a mitigation of his government plans. García and Quintero come to the conclusion that this 
media coverage affected the voting results, and thus provided immediate political profitability 
for Uribe.  
Some other scholars have tried to move away from the understanding of media 
representations of war as solely intended to organize a polarized social setting and thus dictate 
the political positions available to exercise citizenship in Colombia. Feminist theorist Mara 
Viveros67 develops a compelling argument around the media’s use of the values associated with 
whiteness and manhood during Uribe’s administration as a source of political legitimacy and 
popularity. Her work complicates the readings on the regimes of representations of war in 
Colombia and on the ideal of the nation that was publicized by them.  She suggests that the 
legitimacy of Uribe’s administration came mainly from his portrayal of himself as the ultimate 
nationalist, a Colombian embodying all the values that the nation had lost to the hands of 
terrorism.  
Furthermore, Viveros argues that there was a valuation and commodification of cultural 
identity promoted in this period, and simultaneously, a reinforcement of a process of 
marginalization in the power axis of race, gender, class, and ethnicity.  Naming Uribe’s approach 
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as neo-nationalist, she concludes that “the rhetoric of mestizaje used by his government as an 
impediment to racial polarization and a discursive valuation of Indigenous and Black people in 
media, as expressions of Colombian diversity, re-configured national identity.”68 
Laura Wexler’s notion of photographic anekphrasis, as an academic tendency to 
overlook the violence occurring in and through photographs, seems to work here to describe the 
current scholarship on media representations about the armed conflict in Colombia, particularly 
those works examining state narratives on war and peace. Furthermore, to render the archive as a 
mere demonstration of the attempts at media manipulation of the Colombian population is to 
foreclose the possibility to inscribe it in a larger historicist process that works as the privileged 
avenue to reconfigure the nation’s limits and its sovereign power.69 
These studies show the growing interest in academic research to address the political 
phenomenon represented by Uribe’s presidency and thus, an appreciation of the important role of 
his government’s efforts to shape the understanding of the armed conflict through media. 
Furthermore, they provide foundational elements to consider the historicist practices embedded 
in those efforts and to examine its effects in the years to come. This research seeks to be a step 
towards the examination of those historicist practices, clearly disregarded by the current 
scholarship analyzing the cultural texts stemming from mass media.  
Methodology and Methods 
This research analyzes T.V commercials produced by institutions of the Colombian state 
such as the Army and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. The commercials were 
broadcast on national television, in both private and state-owned networks, between 2002-2016. 
In this study, these commercials are considered to be symptomatic of the circulating narratives 
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on war and peace put forward by the Colombian state recently, and thus, as an avenue to 
approach the historicist practices and mechanisms of the state to process the war, as well as their 
intricate ties with national building ideals.  
In developing the research questions, the intention is to address the tensions among 
state’s policies, the context of violence of the country, and the larger meta-narrative about the 
history of the nation (See Appendix 1). The study is guided by the following main research 
question: How do the narratives on war and peace embedded in Colombian state’ campaigns 
configure historicist practices that seek to determine the ways in which the nation is imagined? 
From here is possible to formulate three secondary research questions:  
RQ1.What are the main visual and oral features of the narratives on war and peace 
present in Colombian state mass media campaigns? 
RQ2.What are the rhetorical devices used to narrate war and peace in the TV 
commercials produced by the Colombian state? 
RQ3.What are the changes and continuities between campaigns about the inevitability of 
war and the subsequent representations of the inexorability of peace? 
Methodology  
The approach is meant to deconstruct he state’s narratives on war and peace in 
Colombia. Deconstruction, a term coined by Jacques Derrida, is a concept that has been widely 
discussed, debated and defined; Derrida himself claimed on one occasion that deconstruction did 
not mean anything.70For the purpose of this research, deconstruction is understood as defined by 
Gayatri Spivak in her preface to Of Grammatology: “To locate the promising marginal text, to 
disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to 
reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is 
                                                 




always already inscribed.”71 Merging the analysis of visual culture with hauntology theories in 
examining historical violence, Ruby Tapia echoes Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved in posing the 
challenge to “say things that are pictures and picture things that are not.”72 “Saying things that 
are pictures” demands an effort to re-build the concealed bonds between the images and the 
social structures of power of which they are evidence.  “Picture things that are not” means to fill 
in the gaps of the fractured narrative that the image seeks to promote.  
In considering the commercials from this perspective, the underlying contention of this 
study is that in the interrogation and critique of the narratives of power, lies the possibility to 
craft new narratives, and in this particular case, to unsettle the nationalist discourses embedded in 
these visual representations of the Colombian armed conflict. Taking this notion of 
deconstruction as a starting point, and considering the significant insights of feminists to visual 
culture studies, the research draws from fe inist film analysis, “a theoretical examination of 
films in terms of their signifying process means understanding that depictions of social ‘reality’ 
are mediated by a signifying mode with its own specific structures and determinations.”73 Since 
the commercials are produced as a set of representations that allegedly speak to the reality of the 
conflict but that are not  (generally) presented as “true” stories -rather they use actors and 
manufactured settings and plots- this research will consider them as belonging to the same realm 
as films, that is, as cultural products that constitute “a dynamic process of the production of 
meanings, inscribed into the larger context of social relations (…) a play of signification, 
dynamism and contradiction.”74  
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This work seeks to follow the dialogue between the systemic violence in Colombia and 
the efforts of the state to produce a history about it. This production of history does not 
necessarily operate on the basis of the erasure of events and its traces (destroying the archive). 
Instead what these cultural texts seem to teach us is that amnesia can also occur via the saturation 
of the historical record, and thus the normalization and officialization of the contexts of violence 
in Colombia. The commercials, as fictional tales of the war, do not necessarily make truth claims 
and yet are deeply invested in knowledge production, in sense-making. This research asks what it 
is about the fictional representations of war and peace that performs the historicist practices of 
the state? As fabricated images of the war, the ‘real’ is inscribed in the commercial as the 
overarching narrative that war spectators must draw from the commercial’s plot.  
The methodological question here could be, following Laura Wexler, what can be 
recovered from the archive produced by the Colombian state about the war? These things to be 
recovered are always elusive (and yet blatantly present); therefore, the question might be 
rephrased borrowing from Avery Gordon’s Ghostly Matters: what can be voked from the 
archive?75 This research considers the archive formed by the commercials as being haunted (an 
archive is haunted no matter what is it about), and it is haunted in both obvious and subtle ways. 
It is indeed an archive dealing with war and peace, and thus the terror of mass killings, 
disappearances, torture and forced displacement, but is also haunted by the forces that have 
shaped the nation. What hauntology allows for the sake of this argument is to establish a tension 
between the margin and the center. And, as explained by Yen Le Espiritu, “we have to be willing 
to become tellers of ghost stories—that is, to pay attention to what modern history has rendered 
ghostly, and to write into being the seething presence of the things that appear to be not there.”76  
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Deconstructing the visual record of the war, produced by the state as government 
advertisement, is a task less invested in presenting a dichotomy between ‘official’ and ‘counter’ 
history, and more interested in examining the interplay of absences and presences, as well as 
their significance.  Because presences and absences are always arrangements of value, the 
narratives are constantly evoking the race, gender, and class cleavages that the nation -as a 
powerful idea77- underpins. As Gordon reminds us, history “is that ghostly totality that 
articulates and disarticulates itself and the subjects who inhabit it.”78 
The methodology of Feminist film analysis acknowledges the violences that the image 
can do, but also the powerful potential of looking back. In developing the research there is a 
consideration of being a target of these rhetorical devices that address spectators with a 
framework to understand themselves as part of the imagined community of the Colombian 
nation, as portrayed by the state. But the research also explores the process of developing an 
oppositional gaze,79 a disruptive, deconstructive and defiant look towards the violences that the 
images perform, endorse, obscure, and sanction.  
Methods  
In order to develop the deconstructive effort of this research, and considering the archive 
selected for that purpose, this study employs a textual analysis of the commercials, treating them 
as texts from which a set of narratives on war and peace arise.  Fairclugh (1992) consider that 
texts “constitute a major source of evidence for grounding claims about social structures, 
relations and processes. The evidence we have for these constructs comes from the various 
material forms of social action, including texts.”80 From this perspective the textual analysis of 
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the selected commercials will enable a discussion on the larger social and power structures that 
intervene in the Colombian armed conflict.  
Following the narratives that emerge from the description of the commercials, the 
research provides an exploration of the rhetorical devices or tropes utilized to describe the armed 
conflict and the different social actors involved in it. Guided by the textual analysis method 
described above, the visual, oral and textual representations in the commercials compound the 
archive analyzed under the light of its immediate political intentions and its function as a 
mechanism for legitimating past and current state-sanctioned violence. The analysis also 
attempts to address where these rhetorical devices come from and how they contribute to the 









The commercial opens with the image of a Spanish soldier in a horse looking from a 
mountain top, in white letters the viewer reads “XIX century- Libertarian Campaign.” Then, in 
the horizon, an explosion begins a slow motion sequence and sets the stage for a great battle to 
begin: Spanish soldiers on one side and peasant rebels carrying the Colombian flag on the other, 
all advancing into the battlefield. The colonial army is larger in numbers and stronger in 
weapons. There is another explosion. A man hides in the grass, and looking to his left he says “It 
looks hard right?” A face-painted modern Colombian soldier responds: “But we can do it!” Past 
and present warriors emerge from the ground to face their enemy, while helicopters fly over the 
scene. A narrator’s voice is heard: “Times might have changed, but our heroes’ objective 
remains the same: to fight for freedom, sovereignty, and security in Colombia. Heroes in 
Colombia do exist!” Before the end of the commercial, the Army’s logo is displayed and under it 
a legend that reads: “200 years of honor and glory.”81  
As part of the celebration of the 200 years of what is known in Colombian history as “the 
independence cry,” the Colombian Army produced the commercial described above. It took “the 
libertarian campaign” nine more years (until 1819) to achieve independence from the Spanish 
Crown and produce with it a new national discourse based on the supremacy of the criollo lite. 
The commercial is part of a media campaign of the Colombian Army called “Heroes in 
Colombia Do Exist,” which magnifies the figure of the soldier, not only as the defender of the 
                                                 





nation but beyond that: as the ultimate brave and selfless hero, committed to the protection of his 
fellow citizens and willing to give up his life for them if necessary.  
These types of campaigns were predominant in state narratives on war during the two 
presidential terms of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and were coherent and constitutive of his policy 
of Democratic Security (DSP) as well as the popularized rhetoric during his period of “war on 
terror.”82 This chapter examines the configuration of these narratives and the rhetorical devices 
utilized to provide a frame83 for the Colombian armed conflict, which created strong ties between 
the history of the war and the identity of the nation. It also considers how peace and 
reconciliation narratives receded during this period as a response to at least two separate political 
events: the failure of the peace negotiations with the FARC attempted by Uribe’s predecessor, 
and the re-insertion of paramilitaries orchestrated under the Law of Justice and Peace of 2005.  
The idea of war spectacles has a twofold meaning: first, as the ways in which the 
emergence of representations of violence are spectacles crafted for an audience by developing a 
set of rhetorical devices; and second, the title suggests that the narratives of war configure a 
particular lens for these audiences to see and understand national reality. These war spectacles 
are by no means the only narratives circulating about the history of the armed conflict in 
Colombia, and it would be difficult to make the case that they hold a hegemonic status. Rather, 
what follows from the examination of these narratives is precisely their unstable character that 
might render political profitability in certain sectors of the Colombian society, but that also 
operate, in a long-term logic, as sedimentation for the historicist practices of the state which 
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produce the nation. This chapter’s main argument is that placing state campaigns within the 
framework of historicist practices allows for new interrogations to rise and to envision a less 
immediate effect of the narratives; in other words, how the nation is imaged helps to understand 
something about how it is magined. 
The concept of imagined communities introduced by Benedict Anderson84 in his 
influential work around nationalism provides a framework to discuss the narratives produced 
about war under the two consecutive administrations of Álvaro Uribe. Anderson’s definition of 
nation as “an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign,”85 emphasizes its homogenizing effect, one that even in the acknowledgment of 
difference (of class, gender, race, ethnicity) is most importantly depicting the nation as “a deep, 
horizontal comradeship.”86  The ‘flattening’ discourse during Uribe’s administration was 
deliberately focused on the war, tracing a divisive line (defined by patriotism) between the 
legitimate members of the nation and the terrorists that were threatening its sovereignty. 
The other relevant aspect in Anderson’s understanding of the nation is that this 
‘horizontal comradeship’ is worthy of sacrifices, often conceived under the idea of death. To kill 
and to give one’s life (e.g., the Colombian soldiers and peasants in the bicentennial commercial), 
become the unquestioned will of every nationalist. Anderson’s arguments are rooted in the 
understanding of nationalism as a culturally, rather than merely politically, fixated phenomenon. 
It is within a cultural setting, and history, that people identify as members of the nation.  
Identification takes place through different strategies of representation bringing together a 
group of different people into an idea of unity and shared interests. Within that process, 
Anderson considered media as having a profound effect in providing the emotional devices for 
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imagining the nation. For example, provincial, local papers help to delimit the geographical 
boundaries of the nation as well as the social dynamics within it. In the case of the South 
American colonies, these media interventions were influential in the fracturing of the Spanish 
Empire into many countries instead of under a continental identity of (Latin) Americanism. 
According to Anderson’s approach, what determines these identities is the mediating function of 
nationalism between the state and the nation, because “official nationalism (…) [is] something 
emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost.”87  
While Anderson provides an important insight to consider the fabrication of the group 
that then becomes the nation, Homi Bhabha88 reminds us of the exclusionary practices that are 
complementary to this process. He argues that there are “complex strategies of cultural 
identification and discursive address that function in the name of ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ and 
make them the immanent subjects and objects of a range of social and literary narratives.”89 The 
configuration of the imagined community is then always in the process of defining where are its 
boundaries and who represents the ideal subjects of the nation-state. In examining the state 
narratives on war in Colombia from 2002 to 2010, the tensions around those boundaries and 
subjects emerge.  
During the administration of Álvaro Uribe, the centrality of war and the militaristic 
solution to the armed conflict were reflected both in policies and in the media. The intertwined 
development of the discourse and the actions of the government were constantly embedded with 
nationalist appeals and the outlining of the new values of the nation.  War not only as a material 
reality, but also as a representational scheme provided the imaginary to think about the nation. 
Furthermore, the ways in which the armed conflict came to be portrayed was essential to the 
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political and military actions that followed. Here it is possible to borrow from Judith Butler’s90 
analysis and her assertion in which war (representational) frames are not separable from their 
material reality.  The ‘frames of war’ that Butler identifies, work to “decide which lives will be 
recognizable as lives and which will not, [and thus] must circulate in order to establish their 
hegemony.”91 The circulation of those frames during the period 2002-2010 exceeded the 
instantaneous effects of raising support for the government’s policies, and came to form an 
ideological archive that reified the racial, gendered, class-based and ethnic hierarchies that 
emerged in Colombia after independence from Spain. Furthermore, this archive was also 
configuring the key tropes that helped with the transition from the inevitability of war to the 
inexorability of peace that has occurred in the most recent period (2010-2016), as a result of the 
current government’s peace negotiations with the guerrilla organization FARC.  
Uribe’s emphasis on the militaristic response to the insurgency of the guerrilla 
organizations FARC and ELN, radically contrasted with his willingness to negotiate with 
paramilitary groups, mainly the AUC. The legal frameworks utilized during his administration to 
guide these seemingly contradictory policies provide important insights on how the historicist 
practices of the state develop in a multiplicity of sites, while constantly reinforcing a core 
ideological archive, which in this case is devoted to the affirmation of the Colombian nation.  
Democratic Security Policy and Law of Justice and Peace 
On June 16 of 2003, president Álvaro Uribe Vélez signed the Democratic Security Policy 
(DSP). In the opening letter of the published format of the policy, Uribe addresses Colombian 
citizens in messianic rhetoric: “The antipode of  democratic policy is terrorism, that seeks to 
impose its will over others sacrificing the lives of thousands (…) in the face of terrorism there 
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can only be one response: to defeat it.” In this short passage Uribe managed to reinforce two 
core ideas of his government: first, that the nation’s enemies are not ideological dissidents, but 
terrorists; and second, that the state has no other choice but to annihilate them. The inevitability 
of war on terror became unquestioned from that point on, bearing a strong presence in Uribe’s 
public addresses, as well as in the media coverage of his administration. Central to the narratives 
on war of this period, embedded in the campaigns of the state, is their alignment with the 
Democratic Security Policy of Uribe’s administration. 
Some authors have argued how the DSP also reflects U.S neocolonial power over 
Colombia. Adam Isacson92 pointed out how there was little concern from the U.S about Uribe’s 
draconian security policies and their consequences.  Beyond the unquestioned support of the 
DSP, political scientist Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín93 argued in 2003, just one year after Uribe had 
become president, that “with its new global war, this time on terrorism, the Bush administration 
offered the Colombian government three basic motifs: first, to frame the Colombian conflict in 
terms of the war on terrorism (…) second, to ask for further relaxations of human rights 
standards (…) and third, (…) to invite deeper intervention.”94 Although Gutiérrez-Sanín has 
ambivalent sentiments around U.S intervention in the Colombian conflict, he provides in this 
passage a fair interpretation of how a larger global discourse and political agenda merges with 
the needs and desires of national elites, both coinciding in a complete disregard for the people 
who actually inhabit the contexts of violence.95  
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Josefina Echavarría96 explores the discourse embedded in the DSP and elaborates on a 
critique of the assumptions of the benefits of a stronger state. Her analysis is guided by the 
premise that “the state in/security produces- it does not prevent- more violence.”97 One of the 
main critiques raised by the policy had to do with the erasure of distinct lines between 
combatants (either forces of the state or ‘illegal armed groups’) and civil society. The policy 
considered measures to involve civilians in an espionage network that was meant to provide 
intelligence information to the state forces; the network worked on the basis of monetary 
incentives to those providing tips regarding the whereabouts of guerrillas. It is worth noting that 
the policy, while formally addressing all ‘illegal armed groups,’ was openly presented by the 
government as the legal tool to end the guerrillas. With the guerrillas as the ultimate enemies of 
the nation, the DSP asked Colombians to actively engage in the fight against terrorism; 
democratic security came to signify that everyone is in charge of protecting the nation.  
This sentiment behind the DSP is synthesized in a commercial produced by the 
Colombian Army in 2008. A sequence of photographs flashes quickly on the screen.  Each set of 
flashes is divided with a screen going black; against a background of violins and drums, a male 
narrator’s voice explains each set. In the first scene two men are looking at some architectural 
plans and pointing to a building: “You are a soldier when you build.” Following next, a teacher 
is talking to a classroom: “You are a soldier when you teach.” The third scene is a doctor 
delivering a newborn to their mother: “You are a soldier when you give life.”  Then, a peasant 
working on the field: “You are a soldier when you plant.” The final set shows a couple of 
soldiers in an open landscape with children gathering around them: “In Colombia we are more 
than 40 million soldiers.” The screen freezes in a scene in which the soldier is giving his cap to 
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one of the children surrounding him; the narrator’s voice echoes the sign which appears in white, 
capital letters: COLOMBIA ONE ARMY (COLOMBIA UN SÓLO EJÉRCITO)98. These 
images of productive and reproductive labor, matching the role of the soldier, place together 
imaginaries not only emergent from the DSP (“everyone must collaborate with securing the 
nation against terrorists”), but also from an envisioned nation which is seemingly progressing in 
the midst of the war. It comes a no surprise that commercials produced by the state do not 
reveal the deep economic inequalities and class differences of a country in which poverty reaches 
27.8% of the population.99 Nevertheless, the commercial does more than merely concealing 
economic hardship: it formulates that war is productive, and thus, state violence, whether 
wielded against ‘terrorists’ or civilians, must be understood as an avenue for development.  
In her analysis of the DSP, Echavarría also argues that the policy produces particular 
imaginaries of the war, that in turn intertwine with those of peace, and that ultimately configure 
national identity imaginaries. She identifies three realms in which this happens: first, in the 
(re)definition of peace as the result of a strong state; second, the reframing of the conflict as a 
war on terror; and third (as a consequence of the previous two), exclusionary dynamics of ‘us’ 
against ‘them’ became more entrenched in the understanding of war promoted by the policy. The 
processes described by Echavarría in her analysis of the DSP are parallel to the ones that can be 
outlined for the commercials and campaigns produced by the state under Uribe’s government. 
Moreover, both the policy and the campaigns belong to the same political discourses, draw from 
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the same ideological archive, and help to configure the historicist practices that not only conceal, 
but also reproduce state violence in Colombia.  
The DSP was, nevertheless, only the preamble to the development of a larger institutional 
adjustment to the government’s agenda. Another juridical landmark took place two years later 
with Law 975 of 2005, also known as Law of Justice and Peace (LJP). The LJP was designed as 
the result of the agreements between the national government and the paramilitary organization 
AUC, although it was formally presented as a legal framework for a period of ‘transition’ that 
contemplated the reinsertion of members of any ‘illegal armed group’. Among a great number of 
critiques, the LJP has been under scrutiny for proclaiming a transitional scenario in the middle of 
the conflict.100  
Alejandro Castillejo101 highlights some of the most relevant critiques of the LJP: the Law 
seeks to erase the ties between the state and paramilitaries,  it was the result of the tensions 
emerging from the agreements with the AUC; it allowed for ‘druglords’ to be included within its 
terms;102 and furthermore, it enabled “a revisionist interpretation of history where longer 
temporalities and structural interpretations of the origins of armed conflict disappeared at least 
from public debate and government-friendly media corporations.”103 Castillejo also analyzes 
how the terminology of the LJP reflected political struggles around the conflict and how it was 
named. These nominal practices were in turn shaping what was recognizable as violence, who 
was to be acknowledged as a victim, and who as a perpetrator.  
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The scholarship that has reflected around the juridical regulation of the narratives on war 
and peace in Colombia confirms that there is more to say about the media campaigns produced 
by the state than a mere explanation of them as propaganda.  Castillejo makes the case that the 
language of the law makes unintelligible the structural dimensions of violence and its roots, and 
thus transition scenarios are a promise of newness. However, what if, expanding his argument, 
reconciliation is not only about a ‘new beginning’ but about the fulfillment of a national destiny, 
a mythology crucial to all nationalisms? Then these historicist practices deployed by the 
Colombian state resonate with what Homi Bhabha calls the ambivalent temporalities of the 
nation.104If the legal terminology of this period reflected political struggles around the conflict, 
and thus produced “a hegemonic transformation of the relationship between historical time and 
violence itself,”105 then it can be argued that this change was not exclusive of the legal 
maneuverings that organized and prescribed ways of understanding the war, but larger historicist 
practices that can also be found in other cultural texts, such as the visual devices that are the 
main focus of this research.  
Examining these historicist practices of the state, leads necessarily to an interrogation of 
the motivations to tell a particular history of the war and thus evokes presences that illuminate, 
not a counter-history, but a larger picture in which these texts are possible and needed.  In other 
words, the commercials are simultaneously visual records of the absence of a history and visual 
devices for a particular history to be told. This research can only partially address both 
dimensions. It is possible to ask then, what is it that the history produced leaves behind? What is 
lost after such national history has been outlined? How do these exclusionary practices produce 
the nation? 
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Spectators of War  
Let us return to the bicentennial commercial mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
The commercial is part of the highly publicized campaign “Heroes in Colombia Do Exist”, 
which has been studied and analyzed106 as a powerful tool of state propaganda. Following an 
Althuserian framework, the campaign indeed works as a manifestation of the ideological state 
apparatus (ISA) that seeks the reproduction of structures of power and domination in society.107 
In this case, the ideological appeal of the campaign serves to raise the figure of the soldier and 
concomitantly to reproduce the legitimacy of the state and its forces to exercise control over the 
national territory and its peoples.  
The bicentennial commercial seeks to invoke the foundational violence of the Colombian 
nation.108In the 19th century, an impoverished peasant population exhausted by the colonial 
taxation system, began to show a growing unrest. This situation was quickly seized by the criollo 
elite that was also attentive of the crisis of the Spanish Crown.109 The date that the commercial 
commemorates (1810) is not, however, the landmark of independence in Colombia; it is rather a 
widely-known historical anecdote of an event that took place in the capital of the country on the 
20th of July of that year; “Having mobilized the populacho to defend the homes of the 
supposedly threatened creoles (…) they [creoles] provided the spark for a general explosion by 
deliberately provoking a dispute with a Spanish merchant known to be hostile with creoles.”110  
The actual date of Colombian independence is August 7, 1819, which marks the Battle of 
Boyacá, when royalist forces were defeated by the patriots; therefore, the ‘accurate’ date of 
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bicentennial is yet to happen. What this seemingly small detail helps to elucidate is that 
embedded in the commercial are practices that arrange meanings in ways that work in the 
production of a particular history. The popular protests that actually took place in 1810 have no 
place as visual references for the Independence period, and thus the narrative appeals to the 
armed confrontations between the patriot army and the colonial power.  
The three-minute sequence depicts an epic battle that for the most part does not conflate 
both armies within the same frame; the first part of the narrative is mainly devoted to illustrating 
the differences among them. With an acoustic background of a sorrowful song by a woman 
accompanied by violins and basses, the royalists appear as a formally constituted army; they 
wear uniforms, have sophisticated firearms, cannons, and they also carry their empire’s symbols, 
among them, Spain’s flag. The patriots, on the other hand, have a very basic make up, dressed as 
peasants (all in white clothes) and armed with little more than bayonets and spears. Nevertheless, 
they as well carry a symbol: the modern Colombian flag. The use of this symbolic marker 
denotes the exacerbated nationalism needed now and then to face the enemies of the nation’s 
sovereignty as represented in the flag; a flag that was not adopted until half a century later (in 
1861), after the efforts to form a consolidated larger continental political entity failed.111 In 
weaving together the struggles of ancient and modern patriots, a mythic understanding of the 
nation emerges: the role of the flag is not so much to signify the loyalties of the army, but to 
inscribe in the historical narrative the idea of a nation that was always ready to rise. Benedict 
Anderson112 poses the question of how people come to feel such an attachment to the inventions 
of their imagination. This political love is configured in the commercial by the already-known 
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great destiny of the patriots; to linger in the national consciousness, in the school textbooks, and 
to occupy a privileged status in the annals of history.   
Moreover, the visual disparities between a strong and structured army and an unorganized 
resistance aim to create a climate of unease for the spectator. When the armies finally meet, the 
camera takes the patriots’ barricade as standpoint; it is from behind the bushes that the audience 
sees the first patriot combatants’ fall. Another patriot takes off his hat and, trying to remain 
hidden in the ground, looks at his fellow combatants lying dead in the field; his eyes are watery 
and his facial expression is of despair. However when he talks he sounds eager and concerned, 
but not sad. At this point the commercial reaches its climax when the 19th century patriot looks to 
his left and -without surprise- addresses a 21st century soldier, ‘properly’ dressed and armed. 
Their conversation simultaneously reflects the anguish of the patriot peasant (“It looks hard, 
right?”) and the absolute confidence of the soldier (who in a reassuring and decisive manner, 
responds: “But we can do it!”) Accompanied by the modern army, the patriot leads the way into 
the fight. They start descending from the knoll, meanwhile the narrator’s voice disrupts the 
acoustic background that had been playing: “Times might have changed, but our heroes’ 
objective remains the same: to fight for freedom, sovereignty, and security in Colombia. Heroes 
in Colombia do exist!” The historical linkage embedded in this phrase speaks to the inevitability 
of war then and now, and to the supreme value of the nation in the face of death. The disruption 
of the time continuum of the commercial, just as the other purely fictional elements that are 
included (like the flight of helicopters), work to fulfill the purpose of framing this singular battle 
beyond its historical context, and thus implies that war as a metaphoric space has something to 




Judith Butler113 describes the differential framing of violence as a mechanism to regulate 
affective and ethical dispositions. In this commercial, there is nothing about war and violence 
that is unequivocally wrong; nor is the tragedy of loss presented as insurmountable. The war, 
fought under the ideals of ‘freedom, sovereignty and security.’ is understood and depicted not 
only as necessary, but as essentially good, because it sets up the conditions for the nation ‘to be.’ 
Following Butler, the frame highlights the lineage of heroes that the modern nation must honor; 
and thus the collectivity created (i.e., imagined) deepens the discursive production of ideal 
subjects. While the DSP was trying to produce an ideal nation/army of more than 40 million 
soldiers, the bicentennial commercial emphasizes the exceptionality of the army’s members: 
‘heroes’ who must be admired and rewarded for their commitment, which cannot be matched by 
most. This exceptionality underpins the soldiers’ role in securing sovereignty and the 
consequential subservience of civilians to state forces. These apparently contradictory narratives 
are, however, complementary; they serve as sites to prescribe the working economies of value114 
which in turn organize the ways in which lives are discernible from those who are not.115  
This exceptionality of the soldier as a rhetorical device in the narratives on war during 
Uribe’s administration is, unsurprisingly perhaps, also the response to one of the most horrid 
consequences of the DSP. In 2008, the nation was exposed to a widespread practice in the 
military known as ‘falsos positivos’ (false positives); it consisted of a strategy to produce results 
in terms of bodies of guerrillas killed in combat (positives). To accomplish the necessary 
numbers to back up the DSP and simultaneously obtain benefits that ranged from days off to 
monetary compensation, military units all across the country engaged in the illegal recruitment of 
young men from impoverished areas in the cities using the deception of a job offer. After they 
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were transported to a rural location they were murdered and dressed as guerrillas, then the 
soldiers completed the scene placing weapons near to the bodies.116 The ‘falsos positivos’ draw 
national attention on October, 2008, when the case of 19 young men from the small city of 
Soacha, victims of these so called ‘extrajudicial executions,’117 was clearly tied to the Santander 
Battalion of the Colombian Army.  
The government’s response came three weeks later in the form of the destitution of 27 
members of the military. In his public declaration, Uribe was quick to condemn the crimes, while 
framing them as the result of a misrepresentation of the internal reward system of the Army: “We 
cannot allow for the efficacy in the struggles against delinquents to be mistaken with cowardice 
to face delinquents; and the distortion of efficacy by killing innocent victims.”118 The ‘mistaken 
directives’ were later known by the public as Permanent Ministerial Directive 29/2005 and 
Decree 1400 of 2006.119 The Directive and the Decree authorized monetary compensations for 
military results that included members of illegal armies killed in combat as well as their 
armament. Against the insistence of the government of referring to ‘falsos positivos’ as isolated 
events from these so-called misinterpretations, the reports of cases has only grown in the last 8 
years; and around 5700 cases have been denounced so far. The criminal justice system has 
incarcerated more than 800 soldiers, but the high command of the Army, responsible for 
authorizing the rewards and overseeing military operations, has remained almost intact.120 This 
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scandal followed other highly publicized setbacks for Uribe, who in his second mandate was 
struggling to remain in power for another period.121  
The tainted image of the Army was paradoxically whitewashed through the exaltation of 
those chosen as scapegoats in the “falsos positivos” cases. The campaign “Heroes in Colombia 
Do Exist” evolved from 2008 commercials that portrayed an omnipresent state force, to the ones 
in 2009 that were devoted to describe how the valuation of life made by Colombian soldiers was 
unparalleled. One of the commercials produced in 2008 staged the hidden presence of the army 
as the guarantee of security by highlighting the Army’s careful labor of intelligence and 
depicting sophisticated military technology. The three scenes in the 32-second sequence manage 
to instill the sense of rightful violence in hands of state forces. First, the soldiers hidden in the 
bushes: “Even if you can’t see us, we are always there.” Second, the helicopters overflying a 
field: “Even if you can’t hear us, we are also there.” And finally the low-light green screen at 
the end: “And even if the middle of darkness, we are your guardians.”122 They all work trough a 
duplicity of meaning; to be protected is no different from being threatened. Without its final 
phrase the commercial might as well be directed to the illegal armed groups. As Judith Butler 
reminds us “to be protected from violence by the nation-state is to be exposed to the violence 
wielded by the nation-state, so to rely on the nation-state for protection from violence is precisely 
to exchange one potential violence for another.”123  
An ethical turn in the narrative on war takes place in 2009. It could be argued how that 
turn matched the media exposure of “falsos positivos,” and how the discredit of the military was 
faced with this portrayal of the Hero as not only brave, but most importantly (and remarkably), 
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humanitarian. This is, by no means, a statement of the obvious; concerns around state 
propaganda remain crucial to the development of the scholarship that considers media discourses 
in Colombia and its political implications. However, it is also possible to envision that beyond 
the clearly propagandistic aims of the reorientation of military campaigns, there is a larger 
commentary that reinforces the state’s valuation of lives in a differential way.  
In one of the commercials produced in 2009 for the “Heroes” campaign, the exceptional 
ethics of the soldier are tested both in the battle front and against the audience’s own ethical 
behavior. In an urban neighborhood, three men are walking up a hill, then an explosion is heard 
and on the next frame one of the men has lost a leg. His companions aid him in the midst of the 
confusion and despair created by the exploding landmine. Then, the characters in the screen 
transition from their ‘civilian’ clothes and urban setting, to military uniforms and a jungle 
landscape. The soldiers advance with difficulty and they surprise a man putting together the  
landmine, he quickly surrenders, the soldier who has helping his injured friend is now aiming at 
the man with his weapon and he screams agitatedly. Next a helicopter arrives, more soldiers 
descend to receive the troops, who approach the helicopter rapidly with their injured companion 
in a stretcher, and behind them other soldiers guard the bomber who is now handcuffed. The 
helicopter leaves with all men but one, a soldier remains on the ground wielding his weapon, 
while the slogan of the campaign reads in the middle of the scre n: “Heroes in Colombia do 
exist.”124   
The transition scene might have helped to argue for a return to the rhetoric of “Colombia 
one Army” if it were not for the narrator’s voice that plays along with the images: “What would 
you do, if you see your best friend lose a leg because of a landmine? What would you do if they 
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take away one of your loved ones? What would you do if you found the person who caused all 
this pain? How would you react? Only a hero protects life, no matter whose. Heroes in 
Colombia do exist.” The commercial thus conveys that to respect the life of the enemy, 
regardless of personal pain, is a commitment that only a few in Colombia can make; this is the 
high ethics embodied by the military. The other not-s -subtle logic that the commercial arranges, 
is that the life of the bomber (and this could be easily translated to ‘guerrilla’ or ‘terrorist’ 
according to the circulating rhetoric of the time), is barely a life worth protecting. Only the 
humanitarian soldier will miss the chance to settle things with his enemies, and thus the 
commercial projects onto the ‘rest of Colombians’ the very vices of the state: a complete 
disregard for human life under the idea of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ The ways in which the images 
arrange the value of those lives worth including in the national body linger across the 
commercials and support the historicist practices of the state. 
On the documentary Falsos Positivos produced by Simone Bruno and Dado Carrillo in 
2009, former General José Joaquín Cortés -one of the 27 military officers demoted on October 
28, 2008- complained about being framed by the government in order to mitigate the public’s 
disavowal of the Army. He seeks to justify these crimes by arguing: “It is almost 
understandable, almost understandable, that a troop who is on the battlefield, and a peasant, or 
a guide in the field tells them: -look, that one over there is the one planting the landmines, that 
one is who’s planting the landmines on the road, that one planted the landmine that killed a 
soldier yesterday, that one belongs to the militias, that’s the one bringing food to FARC, that’s 
the one who brings and takes food to guerrillas. And then, maybe one as commander can think 
that this commander of the battalion, of platoon, and that platoon that saw their companion die 




person was the one who planted it, maybe one can think to arrest him, and then simulate a 
combat and kill him.”125  
In his rationalization of “falsos positivos”, Cortés bridges the gap between the carrying 
out of war crimes by the Army and the commercial of the “H roes” campaign in 2009. The 
“hero,” as a trope crucial to the nation’s destiny, is vindicated. Set apart from the “rest of 
Colombians”, the soldier inhabits a site of exception; one that simultaneously glorifies his 
humanitarianism and justifies his crimes. And that difference between the state forces and those 
that they protect binds the violences committed by the first, in the name of the latter, in a national 
complicity. Moreover, when Cortés talks about the ‘peasant’ or “guide in the field,” he is 
referring precisely to the network of informants created by the DSP. If the soldier, in a moment 
of weakness, hurt by the death of one of his companions, commits a crime, it is only because he 
was ‘tipped’ by the community which (the commercial tells us) does not adhere to the same high 
standards of ethics as the military.  
Peace Delusions  
In 2003, Ana María Bejarano examined the shift in government policies regarding the 
armed conflict. According to her, Uribe’s administration represented a rupture of the former 
approach since “not even during the most critical moments (…) did any government dare to even 
question the desirability, the viability, or the convenience of looking for a negotiated 
solution.”126 Bejarano was hopeful that the new government would keep the military under 
civilian control and defeat the rebels; moreover, her main concern was how to deal with leftist 
guerrilla organizations and she underestimated the power of ultra-right wing armies to which she 
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refers as the “so-called paramilitaries.”127 The outcome expected by Bejarano is clearly 
challenged by “falsos positivos,” among a large number of other cases of human rights violations 
committed by the state during Uribe’s administration. However, the distinction she made within 
the legal category of ‘illegal armed groups’ was plausible in the public discourse of the 
government as well as in the legislation of the time.128  
The reminiscence of the failed peace negotiations with the FARC in the previous 
administration, supported Uribe’s platform of “war on terror” and foreclosed narratives of 
possible dialogues with the guerrillas: The answer, as formulated by Uribe in the DSP, was “to 
defeat them.” Public addresses to the guerrillas became increasingly hostile and defiant, with the 
exception perhaps of campaigns calling the lower ranks of the guerrillas to demobilize. These 
campaigns deepened the criminalization of guerrilla organizations and their authoritarian 
structure. Allegedly based on testimonies from former militia members, the commercials were 
also directed to a wider audience, showing these lower ranks as victims of forced recruitment and 
captives themselves.  
One of the stories simultaneously appealed to the hetero-patriarchal order and its 
pervasive nature on the enemy’s lines. The commercial opens with the close-up of a young 
woman’s pregnant body. She’s putting on her uniform inside a green tent, the audience doesn’t 
see her face, but they can hear her voice: “I got pregnant while I was in the guerrilla group and I 
tried to hide it.” On the next frame she’s digging a hole in the ground, when suddenly she puts 
her arms around her belly in a sign of pain, at the same time the boots of another guerrilla 
approach: “But with the hard work I began to bleed and I had to tell the commander.”  A tender 
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image follows next with the scene of another pregnant guerrilla, being caressed by a man that 
stands behind her: “I thought that he [the commander] would understand because his partner 
was pregnant too (…) the norms say we are all equal, but that is a total lie.” The next scene 
shows another guerrilla putting down his weapon and examining some medical equipment (the 
audience still can not see any faces), behind them the young woman is being pushed towards a 
bed; “They made me abort my baby, but the commander’s baby was born;” while she narrates 
the finale of her story the scene shows a close-up of her cheek and a tear dropping. The 
resolution of the commercial merges the guerrilla/victim’s desires to the ones of the state: “That 
is when I started to think about running away, until one day I got my chance,” as the audience 
sees her running across the jungle dropping her jacket (and weapons?) the scene transitions to the 
logo of the Defense Ministry: “Think about it, there is another life. Demobilization is the way 
out.” 129 
The faceless guerrillas of the commercial not only seek to reinforce the testimonial nature 
of the story, they also serve to de-center the case so it is elevated to the status of prescription, and 
therefore one case is a proxy for all. The state stands for the value of freedom that this young 
woman has lost, a state that would criminalize her if she willingly wanted to abort. The concern 
is not then the denial of power to women over their own bodies inside the guerrilla organizations, 
but rather the usurpation of women’s bodies from the sovereign right of the state by the 
‘terrorists’. The dialogue with the members of leftist armies remained locked at the individual 
level during Uribe’s administration; guerrillas running away from their ‘captors’ became one of 
the strategies to weaken these armies and also allowed for the government to claim that the Law 
of Justice and Peace was not made to give impunity to the crimes committed by paramilitaries.  
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At the same time the war on terror (i.e., FARC and ELN) strengthened, the prospects with 
paramilitaries were almost completely the opposite. This was confirmed by the rapid 
demobilization of AUC units starting in 2003 after the signing of the Santa Fé de Ralito 
Agreement.130 But peace with paramilitaries did not alter the government’s agenda, since the 
“terrorist threat” continued to loom over the nation. Thus, as there were not major efforts by the 
media to promote these “peace agreements;” the debate quickly moved away from a discussion 
on peace towards the trope of transitional justice arranged by the LJP. This suspension of peace 
narratives also provided a historical cleavage for Uribe’s administration, whose exceptionality 
was more fiercely promoted than the one of the soldiers in the “Heroes campaign.”  
Conclusion  
Colombian poet and novelist William Ospina131 says “the Colombian territory is one with 
the least calling to unity that one might envision. It is enough to move three hours in any 
direction to find ourselves in a different weather, surrounded by a different vegetation and a 
landscape of always changing depth.”132 What Ospina argues is that the Colombian peoples and 
geographies have always been lacking an element that binds them to one another. The author 
further explains that, in the absence of ethnic, geographical or ancient unity, and as a result of the 
colonial heritage, Colombian elites in the 19th century appealed to the cohesive power of what 
they saw as the only homogenizing avenue: “the role of gathering the population was assumed 
very early by an element that came from outside: the language.”133 If this is true, then the 
historicist practices examined in this chapter might help to argue that for decades now, but in a 
particularly insidious manner in the 21st century, the unifying element of the Colombian nation 
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has been war. This argument does not seek to reify the thesis of Colombia as a historically 
violent country, of an almost pathological cultural condition, but to insist in the powerful effect 
of the narratives on war and peace in fixing national identity within the logic of the armed 
conflict.  
In this chapter, the close reading of the narratives embedded in the commercials is meant 
to gather traces of how the Colombian nation is imagined through the rhetoric of war. Instead of 
a neat picture, the workings of power are always elusive; instead of propaganda -carefully 
crafted to provide political profits- the commercials can be placed in a larger set of practices that, 
based upon nationalist rhetoric, mask the violence within the frame, legitimize violent means and 
glorify its perpetrators as heroes, outline the supreme ideals of the nation, and establish 
hierarchies for the valuation of life. Simultaneously, the regimes of representation that the 
commercials underwrite work towards the delineation of the boundaries of the nation, its peoples 
and territories.  
The following presidential period allowed for the emergence of new narratives that 
promised peace and reconciliation; and yet, the narratives on war from Uribe’s government 
remained relevant in the administration of Juan Manuel Santos. In lieu of the ‘radical rupture’ 
between Uribe’s and Santos’s policies regarding the guerrilla organizations, what can be draw 
from the narratives embedded in the commercials is a more nuanced reconfiguration of state 
violence happening in and out of the screen. Narratives on peace have been deeply influenced by 
the peace negotiations with the FARC in Havana, Cuba. The finalization of the conflict, usually 
framed as the achievement of a national destiny, an assertion of sovereignty and a decoupling 




they coexist with the narratives on war from the previous period work to reinforce the 








“La palabra paz carece de sentido, pero aún así es el mayor anhelo de los Colombianos”134 
 
Introduction  
In 2002, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace produced a documentary that 
examined the failed negotiations with the FARC during Andres Pastrana’s administration. At 
some point, the narrator says “The word peace has no meaning at all, but it still remains as the 
highest desire of Colombians.” The peace process from 1998 to 2002, unfolded in the midst of 
these ambiguities of what peace meant and the constantly reinforced rhetoric that whatever 
sacrifice it required was worth it to finally save the nation, because peace was the unquestionable 
desire of all Colombians. However, on February 20, 2002, the government ended the peace 
negotiations after the FARC kidnapped a commercial flight earlier that day.135 President Pastrana 
addressed the country, making an assessment of the process as a (partial) victory: “today the 
guerrilla has been unmasked, and has shown its real face, the face of pointless violence (…) 
today nobody in Colombia believes the guerrilla is a political option and its popular support is 
close to zero (…) today we are more prepared than ever, more united than ever, more backed up 
internationally, and militarily stronger to face the violence that burdens us.”136 If an agreement 
had not been achiev d, at least Colombians knew their ‘enemy’ better after the peace 
negotiations. The president blamed the FARC for breaking the agreements they had made, and 
publicly condemned them as a terrorist (instead of a political) organization.  
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In order to provide proof of this, the presidential address included the display of a set of 
images accompanied by the sound of gun fires and explosions along with a sorrowful song.  As a 
prelude, Pastrana claimed that “The FARC have done nothing but erasing with their actions the 
spirit of conciliation that they had signed on paper, let’s watch:(…)” The following images were 
meant to depict the devastating effects of the violent acts committed by the FARC: combats, 
blown power towers and bridges, the harassment of civilians, the profanation of sacred places, 
carro-bombas,137 a destroyed bicycle, people crying in the streets, a body lying below a police 
patrol, burned buses, buildings in ruins, the use of gas cylinders as explosive devices, and -in the 
closing frame- an airplane that symbolized the event that caused the end of peace negotiations. 
Perspectives were, nevertheless, not entirely discouraging for Colombians: “Difficult times await 
for us, no doubt about it (…) we must be prepared because it is very likely that terrorist attacks 
will increase, to face this, we -good Colombians- must remain united more than ever (…) we 
must forget our inner divisions, small conflicts, and close lines against violence (…) an army of 
40 million Colombians is invincible.”138 As discussed in Chapter Two, the sentiment of this 
address was later boosted by Uribe in his presidential campaign and administration.  
The year 2010 marked the change of presidential administrations in Colombia, from 
Álvaro Uribe to Juan Manuel Santos. Santos had been Uribe’s Defense Minister from 2006 to 
2009, and he only announced his candidacy when Uribe was ruled out as a candidate, after losing 
a second attempt to reform the Constitution in order to be reelected.  As the government’s 
candidate, Santos’s campaign was focused on the reification of the political strategies of Uribe 
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and the continuation of his ‘legacy.’139 During his first year in power, Santos echoed Uribe’s 
rhetoric of “war on terror” and reinforced the triumphalism of the DSP.140 Nevertheless, Santos 
and Uribe publicly distanced from each other after the new government’s announcement of 
peace negotiations with the FARC.  
This chapter examines the re-activation of peace narratives that paralleled the peace 
negotiations of the government with the FARC, which became public in 2012, and had been 
developing in secrecy during the previous two years.141 It further explores how peace and war 
narratives interact in the portrayal of a nation that can and will recover from the armed conflict; 
and the ways in which this long-awaited peace (re)arranges unallocated responsibilities about the 
past, and reconfigures state violence under the proclamation of a post-conflict era.    
Law of Victims and Land Restitution  
To this day, the numbers of desplazamiento forzado (forced migration) in Colombia 
continue to increase.142 Land (dis)possession has remained at the core of the armed conflict, and 
it is also central to the government’s current efforts of reconciliation. As a consequence of this, 
Law 1448 (also known as Law of Victims and Land Restitution, LVLR), was issued in 2011. 
The LVLR belongs to the legal framework that seeks to install the logics of transitional justice in 
Colombia.143  
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Some authors have argued that the Law was the result of international pressure over the 
Colombian government and a ‘proof of good faith’ about the intentions of the state of protecting 
human rights and seeking peace.144 Nevertheless, the passing of the Law 1448 was mainly a 
response to both the critiques raised by Law of Justice and Peace of 2005, and the need to 
legalize the historical land grabbing in the post-conflict scenario.145 Therefore, the LVLR is not 
only as problematic as the previous law, but also has come to configure new forms of state 
violence which particularly target victims and their lands. 
At first glance, the LVLR might seem to show significant changes in the portrayal of the 
contexts of violence in Colombia. For instance, the Law has been signaled as a landmark in the 
distancing between Uribe’s and Santos’s discourses on war and peace. This is because the Law 
acknowledges the existence of an “armed conflict” in the country, an interpretation that had been 
denied under Uribe’s framing of a “terrorist threat.” And although this shift could be significant 
indeed, it does not challeng the goals of previous policies. Instead the acceptance of the “armed 
conflict” frame, works towards a more discrete legal category of victim which is crucial for both 
the reconciliation and land dispossession agenda of the Colombian state. 
One of the achievements of the LVLR is the re-signification of the legal understanding of 
the victims of the armed conflict.146 The Law limits the possibilities for a person to be considered 
a victim in both temporal and contextual terms. The Law acknowledges as victims with full 
rights (truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition) those who were harmed by 
human rights violations after January 1st, 985.147 Also, the Law denies any responsibility of the 
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state forces in the commission of such human rights violations, and thus legally excludes those 
victims that recognize themselves as “victims of the state.”  It is clear that these delimitations are 
problematic for a number of reasons: they do not account for the highly reinforced thesis of a 
continuum of war and violence in the country; they work towards the erasure of state crimes; and 
finally –the most troubling aspect of all- they work towards the compression of the political 
identification of “victim,” into the legal category crafted and imposed by the state.  
The scholarship around the trajectories of victims’ organizations in Colombia contesting 
state actions has reflected on the ways in which the experience of violence by a person or a group 
becomes an avenue to create “emotional communities in which pain transcends indignation and 
propels organization and activism.”148 From this argument it follows that the self-recognition as 
victims allows those who had experience violence to come together, develop joint agendas and 
challenge the social amnesia around violence. The LVLR provides, nevertheless, a less 
encouraging scenario: the legal constraints imposed in the category of victim are reinforced by 
highly bureaucratic and complex mechanisms that obstruct the participation of victims and their 
organizations in decision-making processes and the overall interactions of victims with the state 
in the procedures related to justice and reparation.149 These exclusionary practices against 
victims150 shed light on the pervasive outcomes of the Law in deepening victims’ vulnerability to 
different forms of violence.  
Considering the large amount of victims of forced migration in Colombia, it comes with 
little surprise that these violences have been particularly intense in matters of land claims and 
restitution. For instance, law scholars Rocío Serrano and Milena Acevedo have argued that “the 
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fact that the law has been issued in the midst of the armed conflict, has intensified land 
dispossession and unchained a new conflict lead by anti-restitution armies who have killed a 
great number of peasant leaders. By February, 2013, there had been at least 683 threats to land-
claimers, and the death of at least 43 restitution leaders in the country.” 151  
The re-articulation of paramilitary armies in the geographies previously dominated by the 
AUC has effectively aligned with the economic plans of the government. Several scholars have 
argued that the National Plan for Development (PND) has goals that collide with those expressed 
in the Law. 152 Therefore, even when the Law claims that its goal is to provide the ways for 
victims to return to their land, these intentions are subordinated to the development of the agro-
industrial complexes on those territories. On this matter, Serrano and Acevedo reminds us that 
“at the same time is a norm of transitional justice, Law 1448, 2011 bears economic and political 
aspects related to he agrarian reform of Santos’s government (2010-2014), that does not only 
aim to legalize land in rural areas, and reestablish victims’ rights, but also [actually] to propel 
agrarian development by supporting private investment and the alliance of state-private 
capital.”153 In other words, the Law manages to seemingly repair victims and simultaneously 
force them to either sell or re-abandon their lands.  
This violent and legal coercion for victims to give up their lands again, is insidiously 
veiled under the national reconciliation discourse. The narratives on war and peace that have 
come along with the legislation on transitional justice in Colombia seek to displace victims as 
political agents and render them as the undesirable byproducts of violence, as well as crucial 
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tropes to ask for an investment on peace. The portrayal of the exceptionality of the ongoing 
peace negotiations has contributed significantly to this purpose.  
Peace Negotiations with the FARC  
On September 4, 2012, president Juan Manuel Santos officially announced the beginning 
of peace negotiations with the FARC, as well as the results of a previous phase of dialogues 
between the guerrilla organization and the government. Given the discredit of guerrillas -crucial 
to the rhetoric of war on terror- and the previous failed experiences of peace negotiations, Santos 
had to present this process under the light of exceptionality. He addressed the country from the 
presidential palace and accompanied by his government cabinet as well as the highest ranks of 
the military. In one of his opening phrases he argued: “I am convinced that we face a real 
opportunity to end definitely the internal armed conflict.” This “real opportunity” was supported, 
according to Santos, by two main particularities of the historical moment of his government: that 
Colombia had changed and that this agreement was different. Changes were understood in terms 
of economic development and military success: “Today we can talk about peace thanks to the 
successes of our military and police, and thanks to the growing presence of the state in every 
inch of the national territory.” And the exceptionality of the agreement lied in that the peace 
negotiations would not imply the de-escalation of armed confrontations: “This agreement is 
different because it does not include territorial concessions154 and because there is not ceasing 
of military operations.” The peace negotiations were thus framed as the ultimate goal of war: 
“We do not fight for the sake of fighting, we fight to achieve peace.” Moreover, Santos 
proclaimed his own place in national history: “There are times in history in which a leader must 
decide if he risks to take new paths to solve the fundamental issues of his nation. This is one of 
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those times. There are risks no doubt, but I believe history will be much more severe with all of 
us if we do not seize the opportunity before us. In any case the responsibility of this decision will 
fall on my shoulders and only mine. ” This presidential address set in motion the legal and 
discursive efforts of the state for promoting peace as well as a mass media frenzy around the 
development of the dialogues. 
Nevertheless, casting away fears that had feed into the inevitability of war during the last 
decade has proved harder than the government initially expected. This is due, to a large degree, 
to the strong opposition raised by the extreme right-wing party led by former president Álvaro 
Uribe. This “war on peace”155 reflects a cleavage among the Colombian elites, “divided between 
one sector linked to former president Álvaro Uribe, linked to the rural power of land-owners and, 
therefore, direct representative in the political arena of the main drug-lords and paramilitaries 
(…) and on the other hand, Juan Manuel Santos, exponent of a more urban oligarchy, linked to 
the big industrial complexes of communication and favored political representative of 
transnational industries in the country.”156Banking on the anxieties extended to the Colombian 
audiences under the rhetoric of “terrorist threat,” Uribe remains relevant in the political arena 
and has managed to perform an opposition that obscures the concerns of other sectors with the 
peace negotiations, especially those raised by victims’ organizations. Therefore, to acknowledge 
Uribe’s party as the government’s opposition dismisses opponents, of both Uribe and Santos, as 
being outside the Colombian political scene.  
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The peace negotiations were planned in three stages: exploratory, end of conflict and 
peace building.157 During the first stage, which ended on August 26, 2012 both parties agreed to 
the rules and agenda of the forthcoming discussions, which were presented the day of Santos’s 
address, under the document “General Agreement to End the Conflict.” Scholar Giohanny Olave, 
has argued about this agreement that “it vindicates the bellicose policy in presenting peace as the 
noblest of ends which justifies the infamous history of its means, means that are not open to 
discussion.”158His critique suggest that the document only points to superficial compromises 
between the FARC and the government, but nonetheless the understandings of what the “end of 
the conflict” means for each one reflects a deep mismatch of goals and perspectives.  
The second phase was the peace conversations in Havana, Cuba which started on 
November, 2012. Following the General Agreement, these discussions considered six main 
points in the agenda: 1) Comprehensive agrarian development; 2) Political participation; 3) End 
of the conflict; 4) Solution to the illicit drugs problem; 5) Victims and 6) Implementation, 
verification and countersignature. After four years of negotiations, on June 22, 2016, the 
government and the FARC signed the agreement on point number three of the agenda, which 
lead to the proclamation of the “last day of war." The bilateral cease of fire, guarantees on 
security and combat to paramilitaries, and the surrender of weapons on the FARC’s side were the 
three core achievements presented to the audiences. In a ceremony that included the presence of 
the General Secretary of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon as well as several presidents of Latin American 
countries, both FARC and government representatives announced the day as a historical 
landmark. While president Santos claimed “today-fortunately- with what we just signed, we turn 
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from this tragic and long page of our history (…) it is time for us to be a normal country, a 
country in peace!;” FARC commander Timoleón Jiménez (alias Timochenko) sanctioned “th  
main beneficiaries of our effort will be the future generations (…) may this be the last day of the 
war!”  
The peace negotiations have been consistently framed under this light of historical 
exceptionality that does not only assures the success of the dialogues but also locates national 
subjects as recipients of the actions and decisions of the state and its acknowledged political 
opponents. In the narratives emanating from the peace negotiations, war is addressed in terms of 
the armed confrontation between the Colombian military and the FARC, and thus, to ‘put an end 
to the conflict’ means precisely the cease of hostilities among the two. Both parties locate the 
motivation of their historical efforts in the nation as a whole; war was fought because a people 
had to be protected/vindicated and now peace is being signed so the people do not have to suffer 
more the consequences of the war. The expected gratitude that follows from ‘the people’ links 
the historicist practices of the state with another trope embedded in the narratives of peace and 
reconciliation: progress and development, which are only possible with peace and the required 
approbatory gesture of the victims towards it.159  
Faith in the Cause  
In consonance with the characteristics of the peace negotiations in Havana, the narratives 
emanating from the Colombian state during Santos’s government consistently encouraged a 
climate of reconciliation without stopping the promotion of war. The 2011 Army campaign 
“Faith in the Cause” is centered on the increased presence of the state (i.e., the armed forces) in 
the national territory at the same time that it summarizes aims of recruitment, celebration of the 





military and a historical inflexion in which the nation (the cause) finds itself grateful and ready 
to develop.  
The campaign’s commercial has a simple overarching plot: the Colombian people 
(specifically those who live in the rural areas) are sending a message to the Army, the 
messengers (mainly young people) run through the diverse landscapes of the country in the 
search for the soldier that must be praised and acknowledged as a hero. In one of the scenes, the 
screen shows a young boy running through a bridge and then across a river. He then arrives to a 
small town of Indigenous houses called malokas. A group of six people are gathered and one of 
the men talks in an Indigenous language, with no captions available for the audience. Then, the 
camera follows another one of the young men, who exits the scene running.160 The previous and 
subsequent scenes provide meaning for the appearance of these linguistically unintelligible 
characters that are placed in a spatial setting and dressed in a way that is meant to visually fixate 
them as Indigenous people: they are praising the renewed presence of the state and how this has 
secured territories and peoples, furthermore, how it has protected tradition and diversity. 
Lisa Lowe argues that official multiculturalism, like the one found in the commercial 
“Faith in the cause,” does not make visible the needs of historically marginalized populations, 
rather “it precisely obscures the ways in which that aesthetic representation is not analogue for 
the material positions, means, or resources of those populations.”161 Along the same lines, Sara 
Ahmed considers how “cultural differences that have historically been sites of struggle and 
antagonism are appropriated and neutralized as a sign of ‘our’ history.”162 The use of 
multiculturalism as a trope in the campaigns that promote the military capacity of the state and 
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announce its victory over the “terrorist threat,” serves as a site to examine the portrayal of the 
citizen-subjects and the ideals of nationhood that enable the history of the war (as the history of 
the nation) to ‘make sense’; and simultaneously works towards the concealment of the historical 
oppression and marginalization of Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and rural populations in the 
country.  
Boal and Moallen refer to this aesthetic and rhetorical move as multicultural nationalism, 
which represents the state’s ffort to overcome its inability to address the tensions that result 
from cultural diversity within the nation. Arguing the essentialist nature of multicultural 
nationalism and the problematic definition of cultural entities as static ways of living, the authors 
point to the commodification of cultural diversity and its inevitable insertion in the logics of 
capital; “it is not easy, therefore, to see how multiculturalism (…) can oppose an uncritical and 
commercialized notion of culture, which uses identity and ethnicity to create subjects incessantly 
being reformed within market-centered ideas of empowerment and endless choice-making 
capacities.” 163 Their arguments enable a reflection on the compromises that the state imposes on 
minorities during war and peace times. Development and economic progress are only possible 
because of the protection that law enforcement provides in rural areas, therefore, it will be 
incumbent on the communities to seize this time of peace and tranquility to ‘pull themselves out’ 
of poverty. One of the women characters in the commercial e hoed this logic, when in talking to 
a young boy she says: “Alex go on and tell them that their job, like mine, is of patience and 
constancy and for that I’m grateful. Go on and tell them!” Her job is manual gold panning in a 
river, and by equating this traditional economy with the labor of the soldier, the communicative 
effect is that the state is granting the conditions for people’s subsistence trough their own hard 
work. 
                                                 




Several meanings emerge from the commercial: first, Colombia, as claimed in the bill of 
rights,164 is a multicultural nation; second, what matters the most in this formulation is not 
cultural diversity but the discrete imagined community of the nation; and third, diversity can be 
measured in the form of preserved traditions such as clothing, settlements and language. The 
national unity of these culturally diverse and traditional groups of people is possible because of 
their shared investment in the reconciliation of the country and their gratefulness towards law 
enforcement for protecting the same thing they are performing. According to Benedict 
Anderson’s165 description of the emergence of Latin American nations, the concept of 
nationhood in these countries was built upon the erasure of Indigenous’ and Afro-descendants’ 
cultural identities under the umbrella of mestizaje. A sense of racial, ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity seems to stem from his analysis. However, Anderson also makes the case that one 
can be invited into the imagined community. Therefore, it is worth noticing the ways in which 
minority groups are invited into the reconciled country, centering and making them the very 
visual representation of the nation.   
This argument has a particularly incisive effect in the understanding of the armed conflict 
in Colombia. As discussed before, one of the main tropes in the historicist practices of the state 
on war, is that the absence of the state in certain geographies of the country allowed for the rise 
of terror perpetrated by illegal armies. Nevertheless, as Thomas Biolsi166 reminds us, the 
homogeneity of the modern nation-state is a mistaken assumption; responding to different 
political needs, the state can relinquish to exercise sovereignty in certain zones of the territory. 
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The once absent Colombian state is now claiming back its sovereign right over the territory and 
the people that inhabit it. Through the appeal to multiculturalism as a rhetorical device to 
imagine the nation, the Colombian state exerts multiple violences against historically 
marginalized populations, first acknowledging the abandonment of the state of large portions of 
the country, then presenting a paid debt by means of the reinforced presence of the law 
enforcement in rural areas, and finally profiting politically of its portrayal of cultural diversity, 
erasing any responsibility of the state whether it be for omission or action. Under the veil of 
multicultural recognition, the state attempts to reclaim legitimacy, deny the needs of minorities, 
and fabricate a sense of nationhood in which “the ‘we’ of the nation can violently reproduce 
itself in the name of liberal inclusion.”167 
Because multiculturalism “introduces complexities of attachment, belongingness and 
identity,”168 then this benevolent state, represented in its military forces, is now ready to leave 
the war behind and incorporate in its imagined community only those forgiving and forgetful 
subjects that do not look back but instead engage with the progress that comes along with peace.  
If, as Biolsi argues, “to have or to claim particular rights- that is, to be a political subject of any 
kind- is necessarily to inhabit particular forms of imagined or achieved-even if unstable or 
contested- political space,”169 then it is only in this projected image of the nation that citizenship 
(and the exercise, demand or bestowment of rights) is possible.  
Peace is Possible, Let’s Prepare for Peace  
After one year of peace negotiations with FARC – and upon the finalization of round 
eighteen of discussions- the chief of the government’s delegation in Havana, Humberto de la 
Calle, made an assessment of the advances of the process: “We would have wanted more results, 
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but he have advanced. (…) To dream with a country in peace is possible. We can change the 
history of Colombia, here and now, to give to our children and the new generations of 
Colombians a different country, in which the pain and suffering of the war are not longer the 
everyday news.”170 At the end of his address, De la Calle added a phrase that will become a 
motto for following campaigns on peace produced by the Colombian state: “peace is possible, 
let’s prepare for peace!”  The possibility and proximity of peace that emanates from the 
exceptionality of these peace negotiations, has been at the core of the narratives on national 
reconciliation that have paralleled the events in Havana during the last four years.  
While the narratives on war during this period were mostly focused on rural populations 
(allegedly recovered from the horrors of war) expressing their gratitude for the protection 
provided by the state, the narratives on peace switch peoples and settings to install the labor of 
reconciliation as a responsibility of the younger generations that inhabit urban areas and that, as 
presented in the campaigns, have not experienced the war first hand. One of the “Peace is 
possible” commercials opens with a ten seconds sequence that shows consecutively the close up 
of seven young men and one young woman, each one looking straight and defiantly to the 
camera. Along with the images the narrator says “We grew up in the midst of the struggle 
against drug-trafficking, we listened daily to the words: guerrilla, kidnapping, attacks. We got 
used to that as the normal life, but it is not.”171 The following sequence shows more young 
people, enjoying the city: reading in a park, playing pool, riding bikes, and running, singing and 
playing the guitar, playing basketball, happily working, camping, driving and walking in the 
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streets. The narrator continues: “Today, we can respond, and be the generation that dares to 
break from indifference. If we are the generation of the future, let’s change the present! Peace is 
possible, let’s prepare for peace.” These portrayals of the city as a joyful space in which the new 
generations can detach from the daily reminded violence, locates the war both temporally and 
geographically; a war that happened sometime in an imprecise past is constantly imagined as 
having occurred somewhere else in the inhospitable geographies of the country. The possibility 
of peace is configured as detachment, as the opportunity to live life happily, or as Santos argued 
“to be a normal country.” The desire for normalcy is visually linked with the inhabitation of the 
public space, and in order to become a ‘public’ in themselves, these young people demonstrate 
the expected euphoria of no longer hearing the echoes of the war.  
Another “Peace is possible” commercial consists of the narrative of a 72-year-old Afro-
Colombian man whose face is framed uninterruptedly during the 30-second visual piece. 
Portraying him as an elder, his narrative confronts the incredulity towards the peace process by 
presenting a national identity capable of overcoming historical impossibilities: “At 72 years-old, 
I’m an expert in watching things happen in Colombia that were impossible, to see our soccer 
team in a world cup, and we are on our fifth; that a Colombian could win a Nobel prize, and it 
also happened; that our cyclists win in Europe, or that our singers were world famous. And now 
I wonder: what was impossible? That is why I’m telling everyone who believes achieving peace 
is impossible, that Colombians achieve everything we set ourselves up to, and this 50-year war, 
we can end it as well.” 172 Signifcantly enough, the man’s lips only move in the commercial to 
show a large smile, but his voice is heard in the background and not trough his direct 
engagement with the audience. The man’s testimony unfolds as he slowly raises his head, from 
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looking at the ground to facing the camera; his excited grin meets the audience upon the ending 
of his optimistic speech, extending an invitation to end the war, as the ultimate impossibility to 
be overcome by Colombians. During the first years of the negotiations these persuasive moves 
might have been considered necessary, even crucial in order to shift the affective orientation of 
the citizenry around the ways in which the conflict should be solved. Yet, what is most relevant 
for the purpose of this discussion, is not the propagandistic aims the commercials had, but how 
the promotion of peace requires a historical narrative of the nation as thriving in spite of 
adversity and to graft on this responsibility to a new generation of citizens whose concerns must 
be focused on “building peace,” and “changing the future” so as not to develop any kind of links 
to the past and present violences in the country.  
While aspiring to amnesia and concealment of state-sanctioned violence, the celebration 
of the proximity of peace has been meticulously balanced with the reminding of the horrors of 
war. Victims’ testimonies and visual devices contrasting the ‘now’ and ‘then’, are presented in 
the campaigns and seem to produce an ambivalent aim of affective orientation of the audiences. 
On one hand, the first two commercials discussed in this section provide an invitation to feel 
good about the historical opportunity that Colombians face with the peace negotiations, and on 
the other, some other visual pieces are invested in what Sara Ahmed calls the politics of bad 
feeling.173 However, the simultaneous working of these politics of good and bad feelings does 
not provide a contradictory narrative but instead locates expectations on the imagined national 
subjects and their respective roles in upholding the nation’s ideals.  
One commercial, filmed entirely in black and white against a piano soundtrack 
background, complicates the generational divide of the “Peace is possible” pieces. In the first 
scenes, two young couples, two men and two women, sit on chairs displayed for them in a set 
                                                 




which divides them from one another with a wall. The camera captures both characters, but they 
cannot see each other. In a black background the audience can read an opening that establishes 
the testimonial nature of the piece: “We invited four young Colombians to talk about their lives 
(…) and this is what happened.” The two young women begin by providing the response to a 
prompt the audience does not hear, but can be easily inferred (something along the lines of: Tell 
me about a dream of yours).  In the following scene the two men also respond to the question; 
then, in another non-prompted response, one of the men says: “for me happiness is (…) my 
family, the things I want to do and I want to achieve.” After they all address their idea of 
happiness, the plot of the commercial unfolds: “Well, honestly I have not been affected much by 
war, honestly, I mean, because in the world that I live, is not, not, the war isn’t (…) well I don’t 
feel it as much,” the screen switches to the set of the two young women, to one of them who 
argues: “Well maybe through newspapers and TV news.”  Then, the two remaining characters 
provide a testimonial account of their experiences with war: “The armed groups came into the 
town, in that time they were recruiting children and my siblings were still, my oldest brother was 
about eleven years-old, ten or eleven years-old. The only way for us to be safe, so to speak, was 
to leave” says the young woman who has not experienced war through the news. The screen 
flashes from one woman to the other during the testimony, and while listening at her set 
companion the other woman starts to show disturbance for what she is hearing. The second 
testimony re-enacts the visual and narrative features of the first one; the young man who has 
previously described happiness in terms of familial bonds and personal aspirations, tells his story 
of war: “They arrived at the house, we were all sleeping and they arrived with guns, and they 
woke us all, and they took my father and my uncle outside (…)” The other young man wraps his 




house, my uncle was shot with a revolver and my father with a rifle.” The commercial closes 
with the two couples standing up and meeting each other. The woman who was forcibly 
displaced with her family says: “Violence, is very hard (…) it’s (sobbing)” and then she 
whispers “I’m sorry.” Then the two men: “I am from Colombia” to what the other responds 
“Colombia”; back to the two women: “from Colombia” and again the response: “Colombia.” 
Each couple merges in a hug, comforting one another. The screen displays a question for the 
audience: “Could anything worst happen to them?” As the commercials cuts to darkness, the 
question turns out to be a rhetorical one: “Yes…that you don’t care. Peace is also in your 
hands.”  
That there is a nationalist appeal at the end of a narrative about the past war and the 
reconciled future of Colombia is almost expected at this point. But the commercial also offers a 
more nuanced elaboration of the ways in which national subjects are expected to engage with 
and invest in the transitional period. The first clue the commercial provides in this direction is 
the euphemistic address of the war: “armed groups” and “armed” people, “they arrived at 
night” and “they were recruiting children.” The audience, it follows, does not need to know if 
‘they’ are guerrilla members, paramilitary squads or state forces. This opaque depiction of 
violence is, again, just the first clue. The second one comes with the divide between victims and 
non-victims as the two available national subjects during and after reconciliation. The visual 
reinforcement of this separation is further accentuated by the apparent rural origins of the two 
young people who have experienced war and the urban origin of the other two. A third aspect 
which shapes the affective intentions of the commercial and their tie with ideals of nationhood is 
when the young woman sobs and ask for forgiveness. Her ‘sorry’ is, the audience can suppose, 




script, her feelings interrupt her. A victim’s apology for showing her emotional reaction to the 
testimony she just provided is the only expression of remorse in a visual piece that concludes 
with an interpellation of the audience to ‘care’ for victims.  
Sara Ahmed has brilliantly conceptualized the ways in which “declarations of shame can 
work to bring ‘the nation’ into existence as a felt community.”174And thus, Ahmed’s insights 
provide a framework to consider the workings of an address which seemingly aims for empathy 
towards the victims and their traumatic stories, but that in many subtle (and not so subtle) ways 
is arranging a present time in which ‘feeling bad’ about the experiences of violence of others 
confirms, rather than challenges, the good nature of non-victim Colombians. Therefore, “the 
recognition of a brutal history is implicitly constructed as the condition for national pride.” 175  
One last commercial produced in 2016 by the Ministry of Defense returns to this brutal 
history once more, and juxtaposes its images - black and white photographs- to those of the 
envisioned bright and vibrant scenarios of reconciliation. The ‘past’ and ‘future’ of the nation 
articulated in the commercial’s narrative imply the need to engage with the labor of transition 
from one to the other: “Where there was bleakness, there will be hope. Where there were 
abandoned fields and displaced people, there will be pineapples, mandarins, mangoes; there will 
be flowers. Where there were orphans, we will see families. Where sometime landmines exploded 
and deafening sounds, life will sound, we will celebrate life. Where there was despair, there will 
be professionals; there will be companies and progress. Where there was misery, there, there 
will be jobs. Where there was fear, we will fill it with smiles. Where there is still mistrust, there 
will be a hug of reconciliation. Peace is the way; there will be a new Colombia for our children. 
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Peace is better than war.”176 The images also traced the radical turn in national history: whereas 
the ‘past’ of Colombia is depicted with desolated fields and buildings in ruins, with images of 
poverty and abandoned children, the ‘future’ is saturated by a warm light that touches on happy 
people and rich and open landscapes, with satisfying scenes of labor and intimate social bonds.    
Conclusion  
Let us return to the announcements made in Havana on June 22. The end of armed 
confrontations set in motion a monumental effort of the government to prepare the country for a 
plebiscite that asked Colombians if they agreed with the compromises made between the 
government and the FARC. In the midst of the growing right-wing opposition led by Uribe, the 
government faced incredulity from some sectors and outright discontent from others. On August 
24, 2016, the final agreement was announced and the peace negotiations ended with the outcome 
promised four years before. This implied that in the following months the ‘Yes to Peace’ 
campaign became central for the Colombian government, producing a large amount of visual 
pieces that were meant to promote the ‘Yes’ vote for the plebiscite.   
The campaign “Sí a la Paz” (Yes to Peace) condensed the elements of the peace 
narratives of the last four years, with a particular emphasis on the younger generations and the 
responsibility of the voters to think of both the children and the victims. This required a trope in 
which both victims and children are presented as wards of the state and of the nation as whole. 
Victims, the argument follows, will be allowed to ‘grow’ into citizenship and economic progress; 
while children in turn, will be gifted with the exceptionality of coming of age in a peaceful 
country. The campaign seeks to evoke an ethical responsibility that depends upon a strong sense 
                                                 





of nationhood and an investment in the production of a historical turning point, the making of a 
legacy.   
One of the commercials, “The children of Colombia want peace,” returns to the different 
geographies of war, although appealing to a new argument. This time interviewing a group of 
children, that shares with the audience their hopes for the future. In gray letters with a white 
background, the screen reads: “We wanted to know what the dreams of Colombian children 
were.”177 A boy, whose name and place of origin are displayed on the screen, talks to the 
camera: “Like I told you I’m going to be an acrobat.” Then, other sign appears: “In zones with 
armed conflict and zones without armed conflict.” Another seven children express their 
imagined futures jobs as divers, football players, teachers, artists, performers, and policemen. 
The narrative signs interrupt once again: “Today we know it. All children in Colombia have big 
dreams, no matter where they come from.” In the next frame, the kids gather and build together a 
Colombian map on a table with clay models of their desired professions. “In order for them to 
make them [the dreams] come true, they need a country in peace (…) Let’s make possible that the 
children in Colombia can fulfill their dreams. Peace is also in your hands.” The commercial 
works towards a generational distancing from the trauma of war. These children, “no matter 
where they are from” are presented as merely Colombian kids full of dreams; violence hasn’t 
corrupted their experiences, and therefore they can stand as a proxy of the pristine national 
future. Unlike the claim to break from indifference present in the previous commercials, this one 
portrays the line between victims and non-victims as opaque; no matter the children’s 
geographical setting, the nation’s veil lends a homogenizing effect to all of them.   
                                                 







The historicist practices of the Colombian state examined in this chapter are not only 
concerned with arranging the meanings of the past in order to produce nationalist ideals for the 
present. They are also deeply invested in the production of a history of the future; by naming a 
transitional period as exceptional (a once-in-a-lifetime-opportunity), a national destiny is 
envisioned and national subjects are distinctively charged with responsibilities to make sure such 
a destiny is fulfilled. The campaign to promote the ‘Yes’ vote in the plebiscite was highly 
indicative of those efforts. The logic of the commercials reflects the words of Santos the day he 
announced the beginning of the negotiations with the FARC: “history will be much more severe 
with all of us if we do not seize the opportunity before us.”  This severity of history looms over 
the nation; furthermore, it brings the nation into existence by prescribing an allegiance to peace 
as the ultimate national project. However, in the midst of the widespread euphoria of the 
proximity of peace, Colombian audiences were also exposed t  the ‘No’ vote campaign led by 
Uribe’s party. This produced a false dichotomy for many, if Uribe stands for the acknowledged 
opposition to the government, then any other objection became almost a political impossibility. 
The dichotomy managed to paralyze actions outside the polarity arranged between those who 
want state violence in the form of warfare and those who propose its reconfiguration under the 
label of peace.  
On October 2nd, 2016 Colombians voted ‘No’ to the plebiscite that would have ratified 
the agreements between the government and the FARC. By a narrow margin of 0,44% (about 
53000 votes) the results of the plebiscite favored the most conservative positions of the political 
spectrum in Colombia. The current situation is filled with ambiguities around what had been 
presented by the government as a major acomplishment. A highly saturated mass media coverage 




signed the final agreement, the ‘No’ option won in the plebiscite, and President Santos was 
awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize.178 Although what has followed in the aftermath of the 
plebiscite is beyond the scope of this research, it is important to highlight t at ‘Yes’ supporters 
have been protesting throughout the country, and demanding a concrete proposal by the ‘No’ 
promoters for the re-negotiation of the agreements. President Juan Manuel Santos has publicly 
expressed his intentions to conclude the process with a negotiated solution and has opened a 
‘National Dialogue’ that incorporates the opposition led by Uribe.  What seems to emanate from 
the current political climate in Colombia is the investment of national subjects in the opportunity 
extended by the state of making history and the envisioning of history making as unequivocally 
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“Today starts the end of the suffering, pain and tragedy of the war” 
Juan Manuel Santos, August 24, 2016. 
 
Victimhood in the Context of Reconciliation  
Vietnamese scholar Yen Le Espiritu poses a challenge to see in the narratives of war the 
endings that are not over.179 An apparently obvious argument suddenly becomes urgent: war in 
Colombia is not over.  And there is not only an ongoing war because of the failed plebiscite, or 
because paramilitary armies continue to terrorize populations under new names; not only because 
there is one guerrilla organization (ELN) that has not signed an agreement with the government; 
and not just due to the fact that the state forces repress social movements in rural and urban areas 
consistently and brutally. The war is not over also because the history of the armed conflict 
continues to work as proxy for national history, and the imagined community of the nation is still 
envisioned as a collectivity whose ties rely in a communal (though uneven) historical experience 
of violence.  
As discussed in this research, tis narrative represents attempts to ‘locate’ violence 
geographically, temporally, and subjectively. In terms of space, the war is attributed to the 
multiple ‘inhospitable’ geographies of the country, based on powerful tropes that can be traced 
back to colonial imaginaries of savagery and the unknown dangers hidden in the jungle. Tropes 
also predominant in the 19th century’s discourse of the criollo elite when they formed a central 
government in the highlands to preserve European values and manners that could not be 
envisioned in the lower geographies where Indigenous groups, people of African descent, and 
mestizo peasants inhabited. It came with little surprise then, that in the 20th century these already 
                                                 




stigmatized territories became the favored scenario of violence. Not that the war did not have 
profound impacts in urban areas across the country, but that the imagery around violence was 
constantly fixating it in the outskirts of the modern nation, hence the alleged difficulty of the 
state in controlling it.         
This history’s temporalities bear an investment in futurity and hope (of winning the war, 
of achieving peace) that arranges a sense of the present as a turning point or, in more legal 
terminology, a transition. Alejandro Castillejo has argued how this sense of the present 
configures “‘a transition in the middle of the conflict’: a transition yet-to-come, a promise to be 
fulfilled.”180 The promise itself configures the notion that the war is in the past, and while the 
present is neither war nor peace, it is a state of longing for what it is to come. As reflected in the 
narratives of the commercials on war and peace, the transitional scenario demands an investment 
on the fulfillment of this national destiny. This investment is, nevertheless, distributed in 
insidious ways that target victims as the ultimate laborers of reconciliation.  
According to this, the visual archive examined in this research also illuminates the ways 
in which national myths are enacted by a set of desired citizen-subjects. Among them, victims of 
the war occupy a particularly problematic place of rhetorical visibility and political isolation. In a 
setting in which reconciliation and post-conflict is not only possible but close, the figure of the 
victim, defined trough legal, academic and mass media narratives, becomes central to the process 
of ending the war. In a disregard of their self-recognition as such, the category of victim 
becomes embedded with the intentions and definitions emanated from the state; because, as 
Patrick Brantlinger reminds us, in terms of social representations of violence “the assertion of 
                                                 




agency is not the same as having it.”181 Victimhood is presented in state narratives as an 
important location from which the efforts of reconciliation should come from. The logic seems to 
ask: who else, but the victims of the armed conflict are the most interested people in achieving 
peace? This rationality legitimizes the obligations projected onto victims, which can be 
formulated as performing the duty to forgive and granting the permission to forget. These 
narratives regulate the affection of different subjects towards war, reconciliation and the nation at 
large. For victims, they prescribe forgiveness and proper ways of mourning. For the ‘rest’ of 
Colombians, they arrange the history of a war as it were over, and they stipulate the politics of 
bad feelings.  
The Duty to Forgive 
Developing his argument around transitional scenarios, Alejandro Castillejo describes 
how “the global gospel of forgiveness and reconciliation is part of a discursive framework and 
assemblages through which this teleological movement takes place.”182 This means that 
forgiveness has a mediating role in history, and with that purpose in mind victims are targeted 
for a melancholic identification with the nation. As discussed in Chapter Three, victims in 
Colombia have faced multiple constraints from the legal apparatus of the state, while 
simultaneously being invoked as the motivation to seek peace. Through its narratives, the state 
imagines and portrays a nation that would restore victims’ rights and sense of protection, and all 
it asks from them in exchange is to relinquish their resentments about the ‘past.’  
Jacques Derrida183 talks about forgiveness as negotiation. What is being negotiated in the 
Colombian scenario is human life, social value, and a sense belonging to the nation; for 
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forgiveness is not only a condition for peace but for the exercise of proper citizenship too. This 
negotiation includes the denial of state responsibility in human rights violations against civil 
society and the acceptance of an unuttered national apology that stands as the only way victims’ 
rights will take shape.   
In the erasure of the state violence that the commercials present there is more than just the 
fabrication of innocence for state officials. There is a larger innocence that spreads to the nation 
as a whole, a repentant state is never about acknowledging responsibility but about insisting in 
the strength of the enemies of the nation, even if that means to present the state as weak. And this 
argument is possible thanks to the fact that the weak state is something from the past, and since 
this has been presented as the enabling condition for war, it follows that contemporarily, with a 
strong state, peace is inevitable. As Ahmed argues, “national shame can be a mechanism for 
reconciliation as self-reconciliation, in which the ‘wrong’ that is committed provides the grounds 
for claiming a national identity (…) by witnessing what is shameful about the past, the nation 
can ‘live up’ to the ideals that secure its identity or being in the present.”184  
The duty to forgive is presented in state narratives as the victims’ responsibility to invest 
in the fulfillment of peace, to endorse past and present violences and to grant the rest of the 
nation the engagement in a collective amnesia about the armed conflict, its causes, and the 
powers that continue to benefit from it. The realization of peace depends upon the temporary 
centering of the victims, formally endowed with rights, but completely lacking rights in essence; 
they must fulfill their duty to the nation in the name of peace. Because forgiveness is the only 
definite solution to an otherwise endless process,185 its effects can be traced beyond the 
immediate compliancy with a specific policy. The subtle and pervasive result is the both forced 
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and persuaded complicity of victims with structures of repression and terror. Forgiveness is 
imposed as a condition for reconciliation and simultaneously works as the consent for new forms 
of state-sanctioned violence, because “confessions and expressions of remorse from liberal states 
and empires therefore enact claims to the legitimacy of their existence.”186  
If the current context of proclaimed reconciliation in Colombia is central to imagining the 
nation, from that follows that normative citizenship must be deeply invested in the achievement 
of peace. Those victims who refuse to do so are not only marked as deviant but also rendered as 
potential liabilities and thus, essentially enemies of the nation. Given the opposition to the 
current peace process raised by extreme-right-wing sectors of the Colombian elites, this is an 
argument hard to put forward. However, it is important to remember that the request for 
forgiveness did not started with these peace agreements, but rather ten years before with the 
reinsertion of paramilitaries. Over and over, victims have been faced in legal courtrooms with 
their victimizers, they have been requested to engage in acts of remorse and forgiveness, and 
finally to invest in the future and detach themselves from their past.   
The Permission to Forget  
Avery Gordon presents a paradoxical condition when considering histories of state 
violence, “hypervisibility is a persistent alibi for the mechanisms that render one unvisible.”187 
What Gordon is arguing is that presence and absences are always arrangements of value, and that 
in many occasions knowledge about violence can circulate (and even abound) without any 
acknowledgment of its present and future consequences. The author’s insights prove helpful to 
grapple with the ways in which the narratives produced by the Colombian state on war and 
peace, bank on the depiction of violence and simultaneously reinforce a sense of detachment 
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with that ‘violent past.’  Amnesia is organized not merely as the fabrication of innocence for the 
state (and society at large) but also as a way of producing a particular national history. The 
forgiveness obtained from the victims, and their rendering as subjects of peace, is also 
permission to forget about them.  
Mimi Thi Nguyen has elaborated on this tensions between forgiveness and historical 
memory: “if forgiveness as a moral obligation compels the subject of freedom to recompense 
liberal war makers for the costs of the war, that forgiveness may consequentially disappear the 
wounded and slain body into the universal history of the human, and banish those who 
experience violence as violence to beyond the humans altogether.” 188 Therefore, forgiveness 
also points to a temporal delimitation of the scope of the war, which in turn establishes 
regulations of proper time frames to grieve and to recover. Along the same lines, Benedict 
Anderson argued that “the nation's biography snatches, against the going mortality rate, 
exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts. But, 
to serve the narrative purpose, these violent deaths must be remembered/forgotten as 'our 
own.'”189 Thus forgiveness closes the door to a violence that is rendered as ‘past,’ and the 
selective movements of remembering and forgetting are experienced in a national synergy of the 
imagined community.  
Historically, in many episodes of national reconciliation there has been a concern with 
healing that is framed from a religious perspective.190 However, the moral imperative to forgive 
in Colombia seems to operate under a more secular logic: it is not a spiritual search for healing, 
rather a neoliberal quest for progress.  This notion of progress clashes with melancholic and 
traumatic attachments to the past. The visual archive examined here provides many examples on 
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how to forgive and to forget are coupled in the name of national development and economic 
prosperity. Therefore, amnesia here does not necessarily imply a complete oblivion or denial of 
the contexts of violence in Colombia, but rather a calculated interplay of presences and absences, 
in which the violences rendered as unvisible are likely to be the ones that will continue to be 
inflicted in the near future.  
Towards an Interrogation of Organized Amnesia and the Contexts of Violence  
This research was concerned on how cultural texts (such as the commercials produced by 
the Colombian state) can structure the possibilities for a nation to be imagined and the violences 
performed along the way.  From a propaganda framework, commercials are a tool for subjection, 
that is, they constitute the ideological domination capable of ‘”producing” particular social 
subjects. From the framework explored here the question of subjection can be displaced into how 
the imagined/imaged subjects of the nation constitute nationalist ideas and produce history in 
ways in which they reify the sovereign right of the state to kill. 191 Narratives on war fulfilling 
this role might not be regarded as particularly exceptional; nevertheless, in the international 
climate of a never-ending war on terror, the narratives on reconciliation in Colombia do provide 
a rich setting to discuss how state violence can transfigure itself, by mimicking a pure ideal such 
as peace.  
This is more complex than saying that peace in Colombia will be “the peace of the 
pacifiers” which is, unquestionably, already happening. The larger question becomes: how does 
this peace stand for a set of historicist practices that enable an envisioning of the Colombian 
nation, one that reifies violence against victims and sets the path to the new violences to come? 
As examined in this research, the history of the war, its tropes and dramatic rhetoric, have been 
amply utilized to provide the Colombian people a sense of belonging and a common goal. And 
                                                 




also as seen in the discussion of the legal actions of the state to deal with the armed conflict, 
there are very few reasons to consider that the ‘new chapter’ in Colombian history (the chapter of 
reconciliation) will offer to victims something more than public acts of remorse, formal 
restitution of land without guarantees to actually return to (or make a living out of it) and a 
national affiliation full of promises that are always yet-to-come.  
This conclusion can be reached from many different sets of cultural texts. The ones 
considered here possess particularities of their own but are taken as symptomatic of the 
historicist practices of the state that seek to produce national myths, imagine proper citizen-
subjects and orient their desires. Yen Le Espiritu urges scholars to not only see the endings that 
are not over, but to do something about them. What to do with this pervasive affective 
orientation of people towards a nationalist ideal remains unclear in this research. Disregarding 
any prescriptive intentions, the task faced is to grapple with the ideological archive that provides 
a framework to bear the unbearable, to (as Derrida puts it) forgive the unforgivable192.  
The ideological archive explored in this research calls for recognition of the ways in 
which the images of national subjects linger in the collective consciousness of the nation, beyond 
the expectation and control of the state that crafts and disseminates such images. Therefore, it 
considers how racial, gender, and class relations of power become entangled and veiled under the 
fictions of democracy and equality provided by national identities. The economies of value 
underwritten by these hierarchies have been one of the main concerns of the field of Ethnic 
Studies and continue to be crucial in the attempts to grapple with the ways in which identities 
work as vehicles of violence. War and peace narratives reify the historical marginalization of 
Indigenous people, Afro-Colombians and impoverished peasants, by presenting their past and 
present conditions as a consequence of the armed conflict and then asserting peace as the 
                                                 




solution for their hardships. Moreover, in its teleological portrayal of history, these narratives 
envision a nation able to thrive thanks to the development of agro-industrial complexes, that, as 
discussed before, are only viable insofar they continue to displace traditional communities from 
their lands. It follows that the transitional period, also referred to as the process of the 
‘construction of a stable and lasting peace’ will be based upon the infliction of old and new 
forms of violence.  
As mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter Three, Colombians are currently facing a time 
of (publicly acknowledged) uncertainty. After more than a decade of the first announcements of 
a ‘transitional period,’ the insecurities about the ratification of the peace agreements with the 
FARC elicit national anxieties and continue to draw the citizenry into an investment on the 
aspirations of reconciliation. Sara Ahmed considers how “politics works in complex ways to 
align individuals with and against others, a process of alignment that shapes the very surface of 
collectivities.”193 The alignments and re-alignments currently shaping the collectivity of the 
Colombian nation continue to point towards the proclamation of a post-conflict era, in which the 
war can become an episode locked in the past and in which the hopes for a reconciled future 
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